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If the central purpose of economics is to understand why and how growth varies across 
countries and over time, Indonesia is surely one of the best laboratories. (Hal Hill, 1996) 
 
 
The big bang decentralization 
Over a decade after the Asian economic crisis, Indonesia has started to regain its grip. After a 
free-fall of the rupiah followed by a spike in inflation, a jump in unemployment and poverty 
rates, Indonesia is now one of the world’s emerging middle-income countries. The road has 
not been easy. Indonesia has undergone a major political transformation, changing from a 
highly centralized political system to one of Asia Pacific’s most vibrant decentralized 
democracies.  
The implementation of Indonesia’s decentralization is dubbed the “big bang decentralization” 
as it rapidly moved the government from being one of the most centralized systems in the 
world to one of the most decentralized ones. Prior to decentralization, 94 percent of the 
country’s revenue was collected by the central government, whereas 60 percent of sub-
national spending was financed by central transfer (World Bank, 2000). This overly-
centralized system has caused dissatisfaction from the resource abundant regions, which felt 
that they were receiving unfair treatment. This dissatisfaction triggered serious threats of 
disintegration from Aceh, West Papua and East Timor. In order to reduce this tension, the 
Indonesian government adopted the Regional Autonomy Law and Fiscal Balancing Law, 
which came into effect in 2000.  
The euphoria of decentralization was sparked by transfer of resources, administrative 
devolution, and the democracy movement. The Fiscal Balancing Law mandated that the 
central government share the revenue from natural resources in a way that would reflect 
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equity with the resource abundant regions. In terms of bureaucracy devolution, the Indonesian 
government decentralized most public service functions to 292 district governments. This 
delegation includes the transfer of around 40 percent of government expenditures and 
approximately 2.4 million civil servants to local governments. Furthermore, since the year 
2000, district heads were elected by democratically elected local parliaments, while five years 
afterwards, they were directly elected by residents.1
 
 This democracy movement, which 
delegates the decision-making process to locals, has created new opportunities for citizens to 
influence policy and budget decisions. Obviously, the “big bang decentralization” has brought 
a new set of circumstances to policy makers in tackling social and economic problems. 
Involving communities to improve service delivery 
In response to the economic crisis, the Indonesian government also decentralized the 
administration of anti-poverty programs to local governments or community representatives, 
including procurement, selection of projects, and identification of beneficiaries. The 
government of Indonesia formulated a nationwide anti-poverty project named the National 
Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM), which was claimed to have been one of the 
largest community-driven development programs in the world that promotes local community 
participation in the project's implementation.  
The idea of decentralizing poverty programs by involving local communities was grounded 
on the assumption that locals have better knowledge regarding who is poor and what can be 
done to help them. Still, the overall effects of this decentralization on accountability are still 
debatable; since they depend on the local institution administer competing interests. These 
local institutions consist of different stakeholders with different interests, while interaction 
among them involves compromises in how to allocate and deliver resources. Consequently, a 
decentralized poverty program can be influenced by local elites, who may alter the nature of 
the program for their benefit. The process whereby transferred resources intended for the 
benefit of the poor are captured by a small number of individuals of superior status is defined 
as elite capture. 
                                                 
1 District level was chosen as the main level of autonomy because the concern from the military at that time that 
provincial autonomy would enhance the possibility of disintegration (World Bank, 2000). 
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The available theoretical literature has identified the factors that are related to greater capture 
of decentralized poverty programs, such as inequality within communities, voter awareness, 
media attention, and transparency in local decision-making. The basic conclusion of the 
literature is that: “The contrasting roles of these diverse factors suggest that the extent of 
relative capture at the local level may well turn out to be context- and system-specific. This 
creates the need for empirical research to identify the nature of relative capture in any given 
setting, in order to appraise the potential pitfalls of decentralization” (Bardhan and 
Mokherjee, 2000). Recognizing this, it is the purpose of chapter 1 to empirically investigate 
the role of elite capture in the context of an Indonesian decentralized anti-poverty program 
named the Urban Poverty Project 2 (UPP2), which was part of the PNPM.  
Indonesia, the fourth largest country in the world, with more than 300 ethnic groups spread 
over some 13,000 islands, tends to be not only very heterogeneous but also highly unequal. 
The available empirical literature shows that in the presence of economic and social 
inequality, there is an even larger local capture conducted by the elite, who may interfere with 
decision-making processes, thus diverting poverty targeting (Araujo et al., 2008; Galasso and 
Ravallion, 2005). Bardhan (2002) argued that in a highly unequal community, collusion may 
be easier to organize between elites because cooperation between influential people and local 
government makes the probability of detection very small, and can create barriers to entry for 
poorer people from participating at all. Nevertheless, Mansuri and Rao (2013) highlighted that 
the relationship between inequality and elite capture can be ambiguous. They illustrate that in 
a persistently unequal rural community, where intergenerational poor have engaged in social 
and economic relations over a long time, collective action may occur if the local leader has an 
interest in it. 
Chapter 1, which is based on joint work with Stephan Klasen, focuses particular attention on 
evidence relating to whether unequal community income distribution may lead to greater elite 
capture. The combination of a detailed UPP2 impact evaluation and the UPP2 administrative 
data allows for an investigation of the link between the structure of power and resource 
allocation made by the elected representatives of the local body. The second contribution of 
chapter 1 is in identifying the bargaining power of the stakeholders in the local institutions, 
and examining how it influences the decision-making process. As each stakeholder has a 
distinct identity and preferences, they tend to balance their own interests with concerns 
derived from their group identity. Vigdor (2004) shows that individuals behave altruistically 
toward the community to which they belong, especially if they share characteristics with (the 
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majority of) the community.
The main finding of chapter 1 confirms the negative relationship between community 
inequality and the allocation of pro-poor projects, which is robust when tested using different 
inequality measurements and alternative dependent variables. This means that the allocation 
of pro-poor projects is significantly lower in unequal communities. Another finding is that 
when representatives in the local institution share the identities of non-elites, the probability 
that they will allocate more resources toward pro-poor projects increases. Although causality 
is difficult to establish, these findings thus suggest that the local power structure is an 
important consideration for poverty-targeting strategies. 
 Accordingly, in chapter 1, an elite index is constructed using 
information from elected community representatives regarding their levels of consumption, 
education, and social connectedness. This elite index is included in order to capture the degree 
of the representative’s bargaining power in the local decision-making process, and how it 
might influence the project’s resource allocation. 
 
Fighting corruption in decentralized Indonesia 
The implementation of a decentralized government system in 2000 was expected to be a 
means of reducing corruption in Indonesia by bringing the government closer to the people. 
The government should be more accountable, because it will be subjected to electoral 
pressure from residents, who are able to monitor service delivery better than the central 
government (Bardhan, 2000). However, Indonesia’s decentralization in fact made local 
governments act as if they were in a race to increase their incomes. Available studies show 
that local governments compete to increase revenue by issuing hundreds of new regulations 
concerning taxes, levies and other fees to regulate business activities (Basri, 2004). 
Consequently, corruption became less predictable, as compared to the Suharto regime, since 
the issuance of new regulations leads to the creation of new departments and the hiring of new 
public officials. Patunru and Wardhani (2008) point out that the bribery rate after 
decentralization is actually lower, but the number of agents, who need to be bribed, increases. 
It is, therefore, unclear whether paying bribes will improve the effectiveness of public service 
delivery. 
Chapter 2 elaborates more on the linkages between bribe payments and the effectiveness of 
public service delivery after the big bang decentralization in Indonesia. The “grease the 
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wheels” hypothesis proposes that bribery may speed up a rigid administration by removing 
barriers to economic activities (Leff, 1964; Leys, 1965; Huntington, 1968; Lui, 1985). 
However, the hypothesis may not be adequate, given the complexity of the transaction. 
Bribery is illegal and kept secret, and this makes it uncertain whether the corrupt official will 
credibly commit to an agreement made during the transaction. Myrdal (1968) and Andvig 
(1991) argued that a corrupt official may deliberately impose administrative delays in order to 
attract further bribes.  
A number of empirical studies that test the “grease the wheels” hypothesis even reveal a “sand 
the wheels” effect of corruption. For instance, Kaufmann and Wei (1999), Henderson and 
Kuncoro (2004), and Fisman and Gatti (2006) use firm-level data and find a positive 
relationship between the amounts of money spent on bribes and bureaucratic procedures. 
These studies conclude that firms that pay higher bribes spend more time with public officials 
to deal with regulations. Even though these results have provided an important alternative to 
the “grease the wheels” hypothesis, they do not take into account the potential reverse 
causality relationship, which may result in inconsistent parameters and therefore misleading 
conclusions. 
Acknowledging this, chapter 2 empirically examines the “grease the wheels” hypothesis by 
using the two survey rounds of MICI data (Monitoring Investment Climate Indicators), which 
contain information about the experiences of firms with bureaucrats in Indonesia. Given the 
advantage of the panel data structure, the lagged value of bribes is used to instrument the 
current bribes. Since the instrumental variable chosen is predetermined, applying the 2SLS 
approach may provide a consistent parameter. As a result, chapter 2 further confirms the 
positive relationship between the amounts spent on bribes paid and managerial contact time 
with officials. In this respect, chapter 2 complements the previous research that has examined 
this specific issue. 
A second contribution of chapter 2 in relation to the literature is its assessment of the “grease 
the wheels” hypothesis within the context of competitive bribery and imperfect information. 
As in a sealed auction, none of the firms know the amounts of bribes paid by their 
competitors. Accordingly, each firm will offer bribes based on its belief about the value that 
will be required to reduce bureaucratic delay. On the other hand, a corrupt official has full 
information of the bribes paid by all firms, as well as firm characteristics. This information 
allows the official to estimate the expected values of bribes from each firm. Chapter 2 
demonstrates that when companies bribed above their expected bribes value, they might be 
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labeled as “weak” firms by officials, leading corrupt officials eventually to extend 
bureaucratic delays. These results affirm the counter-productive effect of bribes, which 
supports the anti-corruption campaigns promoted by governments and international 
organizations. 
  
The role of female policy makers 
Another challenge faced by the Indonesian government after decentralization is ensuring that 
every group of the population is represented in the decision-making process. One year after 
the passing of the Decentralization Law in 1999, the Indonesian president issued presidential 
instructions on gender mainstreaming, which directed all government ministries and agencies 
at the national and local levels to adopt a gender mainstreaming strategy in implementing 
development policies. One of the results was that women’s representation in the national 
legislatures increased significantly, from around 9 percent to about 11.3 percent in the 2004 
elections, and 18 percent in the 2009 elections. Furthermore, a quota law has been passed in 
2009, requiring that women make up 30 percent of political candidates for legislative 
positions. 
The importance of the women’s political reservation policy derives from the argument that 
women have different political interests from men, as expressed in their voting and leadership 
behavior. Therefore, active female participation in the decision-making process is expected to 
produce development outcomes that are more responsive to women's needs. However, little is 
known about whether women representatives accommodate the preferences of their female 
electorates. 
The well-known median voter theory predicts that if democracy is perfect, the winner of a 
political election will be the candidate whose platform represents the preferences of the 
median voter. On this theory, mandating a woman as a candidate would not necessarily 
matter. However, a politician can only enact a policy commitment once she is in office. It is 
still uncertain whether the politician will credibly commit to the voter’s preferences if those 
preferences oppose the politician’s interests. In an alternative economic model of 
representative democracy (the citizen candidate model), Besley and Coate (1997) and 
Osborne and Slivinski (1996) propose to relax the assumption of complete policy 
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commitment, by allowing for the role of the politician’s identity, including their gender, as an 
important factor in policy outcomes. 
Most of the available empirical studies that test the role of gender on policy outcomes focus 
on how gender shapes voting behavior (Edlund and Pande, 2002; Alesina and La Ferrara, 
2005; Lott and Kenny, 1999; and Svaleryd, 2009), or on how female politicians influence 
political outcomes (Rehavi, 2007; Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2013). There are only a few 
studies that analyze the relevance of differences of preferences between male and female 
voters under indirect democracy, and relate this to the differences in preferences between 
male and female politicians, and how these factors simultaneously influence policy outcomes. 
If females and males have different preferences, female politicians may (or may not) make 
different policy choices than male politicians. In other words, if female politicians' 
preferences were the same as their male counterparts, a women’s reservation policy would not 
be necessary. It is thus critical to identify the gender gap in the preferences of both voters and 
politicians, in order to improve our understanding regarding the effectiveness of female 
empowerment in politics. 
Acknowledging these shortcomings, chapter 3, also the result of joint work with Stephan 
Klasen, discusses the role of women as decision makers in the context of Indonesia’s 
decentralized anti-poverty program, UPP2. In particular, chapter 3 examines whether the 
project resource allocation of UPP2 is more responsive to women’s preferences when there is 
a higher number of women representatives in the local institution. Chapter 3 begins by 
testing the median voter theory, then analyzes the role of gender composition in the local 
representative body, and of the gender gap in preferences, in shaping policy outcomes.  
Using rich data on ex-ante preferences of both voters and politicians, it finds that in most 
cases, the preferences of the median voter do not matter for policy outcomes, but in some 
cases they do. It shows that the proportion of the budget allocated to education, health and 
irrigation programs is higher in communities where the median voter raises issues related to 
these particular programs. Furthermore, chapter 3 reveals that the proportion of 
representatives who are female is irrelevant for policy outcomes, but does facilitate 
accommodating the preferences of the median voter, and particularly the preferences of 
female voters who request more attention to public sanitation. It is argued that the effect of 
female representatives is small because female representatives' preferences differ from those 
of their male counterparts only on issues related to public sanitation, but not more generally. 
In the case of UPP2, the similarities in preferences of male and female representatives may be 
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driven by the fact that both groups come from the highest qualified communities, with the 
similar high level of education, higher consumption per capita, and more social 
connectedness. Still, the findings of chapter 3 that show that the gender of the policy maker 
matters cast doubt on the prediction of the median voter theory that only the preferences of 
the median voter determine public policy outcomes.  
 
Policy implications 
The three chapters of this thesis contribute to the understanding of the Indonesian political 
economy in the era of decentralization. They all confirm that institutions and their 
stakeholders matter for development outcomes. One of the main findings of the study is that 
community inequality is an important determinant of pro-poor targeting policies. In this 
context, elite capture, characterized by a community allocating spending that would not have 
been favored by the poor, is evident in more unequal communities. This finding is relevant to 
the hundreds of community-driven development (CDD) programs currently in operation in 
developing countries. The implications are not necessarily that CDD or participatory 
approaches are not working. Instead, the findings suggest that policy makers should put more 
emphasis on the resilience of the local power structure and the decision-making process, and 
on the consequent need for pro-poor initiatives, in order to ensure that the program’s targeting 
focuses on the poor. 
Furthermore, one of the findings also highlights that the rent-seeking activities of corrupt 
officials becomes less predictable after decentralization. It is found that paying higher bribes 
to public official increases, rather than decreases, the share of managerial time spent with 
officials. This finding is not only good news that supports the anti-corruption act; it also 
implies that economic agents should consider the effects on both the level and efficiency of 
bribe transactions. For policy makers, this may include, among other things, simplifying 
bureaucratic procedures, reducing human contact in bureaucratic transactions, or regularly 
rotating public officials' posts. Moreover, any anti-corruption strategies would not be effective 
without the support of credible and independent law enforcement, as well as the support of the 
judiciary and police in providing supervision of officials who administer the delivery of 
public services. 
Finally, chapter 3 examines the role of women elected as local representatives in the local 
institution established by UPP2. It finds that women’s representation is important in 
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accommodating the preferences of female voters. This finding is pertinent in the context of 
the women’s reservation policy that is increasingly implemented at various levels of 
government. In Indonesia, the desired quota of women political candidates has never been 
met, due to the low rate of women’s participation in social and political activities, especially 
in leadership positions. Given our results, policy makers should pay closer attention to 
improving women’s participation in politics, which can be manifested in increasing women's 
capacities and capabilities, enhancing political awareness in local governments, and 




1 Elite capture in urban community-driven 







It has been argued that the potential gains of community-driven development (CDD) poverty programs 
are significant as these can foster sustained poverty reduction. However, the literature shows that 
community involvement can increase the risk of elite capture, particularly in more unequal 
communities where the gap between the poor and the non-poor is larger, making it more difficult for 
the poor to increase their bargaining power and voice their preferences. In this paper, we examine the 
link between elite capture and inequality within the context of CDD programs. Using data sets from a 
nationwide CDD program in Indonesia, the Second Urban Poverty Project, we find robust evidence 
that less equal communities are less likely to receive pro-poor projects. It also finds that the 
probability of receiving a higher share of pro-poor projects increases when policymakers share similar 
characteristics with the locals who have low levels of education, consumption, and social networks. 
  
  
                                                 




Community-driven development (CDD) has become a common mechanism for decentralizing 
anti-poverty programs. The CDD approach works by promoting community involvement in 
project implementation, as it is assumed that locals are best able to understand prevailing local 
conditions, capacities and necessities, and are best suited to identifying the genuine poor.3 In 
their comprehensive review on participation and development, Mansuri and Rao (2004) 
advocate that the potential gains from involving local participation are large. For instance, it 
helps to enhance poverty targeting, creates social capital, and improves the public service 
delivery. It is expected that this approach can minimize rent-seeking behavior that will lead to 
an equal resource allocation and sustain poverty reduction since it will be subjected to local 
pressure from residents, who are able to monitor service delivery. However, many critics note 
that community-driven development initiatives may trigger a local capture. Given the fact that 
the local participants have more information than the donor, people at the top of the 
community distribution may exploit such information for their benefit at a cost to the poor, 
making the CDD approach counterproductive. Mansuri and Rao (2013) further argue that in a 
participatory process, the poor have a higher opportunity cost to participate in civic activities 
than the better off, who are wealthier, more educated, have higher social status, are male, or 
have higher social connections. As a result, the poor may benefit less from social programs 
since the resource allocation processes may reflect the preferences of the elite group. In an 
empirical work, Lanjouw and Ravallion (1998) showed that the poor who are located in 
remote areas with limited information have difficulties in accessing the program benefits, as 
these benefits are first captured by the non-poor who argue that they are entitled to the 
benefits in exchange for their tax payments. Further studies show that a malevolent elite 
engagement that abuses its power to influence the local decision-making process thus alters 
the nature of social programs for the benefit of the elite, are more likely to occur in certain 
contexts (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000; Platteau, 2004; Conning and Kevane, 2002; Araujo 
et al., 2008). 
                                                 
3A CDD program typically involves the establishment of local non-government institutions made up of local 
representatives who are responsible for allocating project resources through anti-poverty actions responding 
directly to the needs of the poor. 
Over the past decade, studies of elite capture have focused on the role of elite capture in 
unequal setting. The existing theoretical literature shows that the relationship between local 
capture and inequality is complex, without a clear pattern that the link is not necessarily 
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monotonic, and can be U-shaped (Bardhan, et al., 2000; Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan, 2002). 
These theoretical works conclude that the correlation between the two variables can be 
context specific, and suggest the need for further empirical research to identify the nature of 
elite capture under different conditions and settings.  
In view of this, several works have attempted to empirically study the relationship between 
inequality and local capture, but not abundant. Galasso and Ravallion (2005) show that in 
Bangladesh’s Food for Education Program, higher inequality in land holding reduces 
allocation to the poor due to the greater power of local elites. Using data from 66 communities 
participating in a CDD projects in the Philippines, Labonne and Chase (2009) match the ex-
ante community preferences with actual funded projects. They report that in unequal 
communities a village leader is more likely to override community preferences. Platteau, 
(2003) argues that the reason why elite capture can be more likely to occur in less equal 
communities is because inequality may increase conflicts of objectives among locals, who 
each tend to promote their own agenda, so that people at the top of the distribution do not 
hesitate to exploit the information gap between donors and communities, ensuring that the 
poor at the bottom of the distribution find it difficult to voice their own preferences. The 
findings of Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) are in line with these grounds, demonstrating that 
inequality lowers the incentive for participation and group interaction, discourages groups 
from making decisions by voting, and therefore lowers group performance.  
In this paper, we investigate the role of elite capture within the context of the World Bank’s 
Urban Poverty Project 2 (UPP2), which was implemented between 2004 and 2007 in 
Indonesia. Using a CDD approach, the UPP2 required every community to establish a Board 
of Community Trustee (Badan Keswadayaan Masyarakat, hereinafter referred to as BKM). 
Every BKM consists of 9-14 elected community representatives who were responsible for 
managing the UPP2 resource allocation. This paper particularly examines the project 
allocation pattern when the locals are unequally distributed. Using a unique combination of 
UPP2 impact evaluation and project administration data, we find that less equal communities 
are less likely to receive pro-poor projects.  
Furthermore, we analyze how the bargaining power within BKM influences the project 
resource allocation. As representatives have a distinct identity and preferences, they tend to 
balance between their interests and the interest that derives from their group identity. Vigdor 
(2004) shows that individuals behave altruistically toward the community they belong to, 
especially if they share similar characteristics with (the majority of) the community. His study 
23 
 
examined the individual’s decision to return the Census questionnaire by mail, and showed 
that individual responses depend on how much the individual internalizes the benefit 
bestowed on the community at large. The similarity between individuals in terms of age, 
education and race in a community determines the internalization of the benefit. In this paper, 
we compute the elite index of each BKM member based on their level of education, 
consumption, and social networks. Our analysis finds that when BKM members are 
dominated by representatives whose characteristics are closer to the non-elites, the chances of 
choosing a pro-poor project increases. 
This paper proceeds as follows. 
 
The second section discusses the UPP2 and its delivery 
mechanism. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy. Section 4 provides the research data 
and statistics. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Finally, in Section 6, the main results 
are summarized, and conclusions are drawn. 
1.2 The Urban Poverty Project 2 
The Urban Poverty Project 2 (UPP2) is part of the Indonesian National Program for 
Community Empowerment (PNPM), one of the largest community-driven development 
poverty alleviation programs in the world. PNPM was launched to response the Asian 
Financial crisis took place in 1997-98 that during the crisis, Indonesia experienced massive 
capital outflows with numerous companies cutting back production and declaring bankruptcy, 
passing to a spike in unemployment rates and thus poverty incidences. As a result, the number 
of people living under the poverty line increased significantly, especially those living in urban 
areas, who were more exposed to the crisis.  
UPP2 was approved in 2002 and implemented between 2004 and 2007. The project expanded 
the UPP1, the precursor coverage area, to the southern part of Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and 
West Nusa Tenggara. In total, the US$127 million project targeted 2,058 urban kelurahans 
spread over 13 provinces, where the selection of the participating kelurahan was based on a 
composite poverty score computed at the sub-district level using socioeconomic and 
demographic variables from the village potential census data (PODES).4
                                                 
4 Indonesia is divided into 33 provinces, which in turn are composed of districts. Each district is further broken 
down into sub-districts. Below the sub-district level, there are villages and urban villages called kelurahan. 
Typically, a kelurahan is divided non-administratively into several neighborhoods (RW) that consists of several 
wards (RT). Each ward manages a certain number of households. 
 The size of the 
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awarded grant per kelurahan depends on population size and poverty density. For instance, a 
kelurahan with population of less than 3,000 people could access grants up to US$16,600, 
while a kelurahan with population of between 3,000 and 10,000 could access up to 
US$27,700 and those with more than 10,000 people could receive up to US$55,400. Poverty 
density also determines the amount of the grant received. If there were 300-1,000 poor 
households in a kelurahan with a population of less than 3,000, the grant would be adjusted to 
US$27,700. Likewise, if there were more than 1,000 poor households in a kelurahan with 
3,000 to 10,000 people, the allocation could rise to US$55,400. 
Using CDD approach, UPP2 capitalized on the Indonesian tradition of gotong royong or 
mutual assistance among residents in development activities. UPP2 required every beneficiary 
community to set up a local community board, the Badan Keswadayaan Masyarakat 
(community board trustee, BKM), consisting of 9-14 elected community representatives or 
board members. These representatives were delegated the authority to manage and implement 
the project resource allocations, including selecting potential beneficiaries and types of action 
for poverty alleviation.  
Given the important role of BKM members, the election mechanism was conducted in several 
stages. Before the grants were disbursed, the UPP2 facilitators invited residents in the 
neighborhood (one level below kelurahan) to attend a neighborhood meeting. The facilitators 
guided a discussion about the qualities that a leader should have, and asked them to identify 
people in the neighborhood who possessed such qualities. The names of the candidates were 
then collected and sent to the kelurahan. The residents were then invited to kelurahan meeting 
to vote for BKM board members through a secret ballot. As a result, the winners of the 
election served as unpaid BKM members.5
Once BKM was established, the elected members led a community discussion among 
kelurahan residents to formulate a community development plan (CDP). In general, it was 
expected that the CDP would include pre-identified investments covering a range of poverty 
alleviation activities, depending on the local circumstances. The local residents could also 
choose to allocate part of the resources to revolving fund projects, where recipients are 
required to repay the loans at low interest rates to maintain the project’s cash flow. The 
project document stated that revolving fund projects were mainly targeted at the non-poor, 
 
                                                 
5 Communities may also opt to form a BKM institution by strengthening the existing local organization, as long 
as the members were chosen democratically and in a participatory manner.  
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with profitable business opportunities and sufficient repayment capacities yet have no other 
access to credit. However, these non-revolving fund projects were expected to create a 
multiplier effect for the poor. Furthermore, for projects that were not listed in the CDP, 
communities could submit project proposals to be assessed by BKM.6
 
 Subsequently, the list 
of poverty programs collected from both community discussions and submitted proposals 
were then discussed by BKM members to assess and executes. Fieldwork showed that most 
BKM decisions were made through discussion, but voting also occurred. 
1.3 Empirical strategy 
In this paper, we analyze the pattern of project types received in each community and 
associate this with the level of community inequality in terms of household consumption. Our 
empirical model is based on the Araujo et al. (2008) who analyze the project allocation 
patterns in Social Fund investment projects in Ecuador. 
Given the two types of projects, the rational poor would prefer private good projects as these 
directly benefit them and meet their basic necessities while the non-poor would prefer public 
good projects since they can only reap the benefit of the project from these projects. In this 
study, we assume that private good projects can only be consumed by the poor since the non-
poor have no interest towards private good projects because basic goods are less needed by 
the non-poor, or they would be excluded from receiving such projects. Based on this 
definition, we define the occurrence of elite capture in poverty programs is when the non-poor 
succeed in influencing local decision-making and alter the nature of poverty programs to 
choose more public good projects rather than private good projects.
The model explains a situation where 
a social program provides two types of projects: public good projects and private good 
projects. Private good projects are basic necessity projects that exclusively provide for the 
poor and cannot be consumed by the non-poor at the same time. In contrast, public good 
projects, which share the characteristics of public goods, are non-excludable and “non-rival” 
as these can be consumed simultaneously by everyone. 
7
                                                 
6 For some extremely high cost projects, financing could be combined from UPP2 funds, local government 
budgets and/or private donors. Community contribution of materials, labour, or land was also possible. 
 Furthermore, the poor 
7 We further assume that (1) there is no mistargeting in the program implementation, that is the non-poor 
received private good sub-projects and  (2) there is no externality associated with private good projects, i.e. that 
the non-poor’s utility will not increase if the poor received private good sub-projects.  
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may find it more difficult to increase their bargaining power in unequal communities, where 
the gap between poor and non-poor and between powers is large.  
Based on this, we hypothesize that the community inequality tends to increase elite capture so 
that the community will choose fewer private good sub-projects compared to public good sub-
projects. Thus, the following cross-section model is estimated:  
 
 𝑃𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼0+𝛽0𝐼𝑖𝑗+𝛽1𝑌𝑖𝑗+𝛽2𝐺𝑖𝑗+𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑗+𝜇𝑗+𝜀𝑖𝑗 (1.1) 
 
Here, the dependent variable, Pij, stands for the share of private good projects per total 
projects received by kelurahan i in the district j. The main variable of interest is the kelurahan 
inequality, Iij, which is computed from the consumption of 32 randomly selected households 
in every community.8 We assume that the political power is positively correlated with 
economic status. In equation (1.1), the elite capture hypothesis is confirmed when the 
parameter β0 is negative, which means that higher inequality is associated with a smaller 
share of private projects received by kelurahan i, holding other variables constant. Our 
specification controls for the mean consumption of the kelurahan (Yij) that represents the 
prosperity level and the pre-existing local public goods (Gij). In addition, the model controls 
for another community level determinants Xij that might affect the project selection. Finally, 
district fixed effects µj
The second objective of this paper is to analyze the role of each board member’s bargaining 
power on project choice. 
 are included. 
To do this, we construct an “elite index” for each board member in 
every BKM. We assume that 
Based on this index, we categorize a BKM member into one of the two categories: BKM 
member with elite status and BKM member without elite status.
the elite status is positively correlated with the combination of 
the level of education, consumption, and social connectedness. Therefore, we use principal 
component analysis (PCA) to compute the elite index for every BKM member. We further 
assume that the bargaining power of each BKM member is increasing with elite status.  
9 Let Sm
                                                 
8 Given that variable inequality is computed based on the consumption of randomly selected 32 households, the 
extent of attenuation bias might be an issue. However, in the estimation results we show that the attenuation bias, 
which usually causes the estimated coefficient to be insignificant, is not really a problem. 
 denotes the elite 
status of BKM member m, thus the categorization can be written as follows: 
9 Given that we define elite as people at the top of the distribution, we use the cut off for categorizing elite status 
if the “elite index” is one standard deviation above the mean. 
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1    with elite status 
Sm
     0    no elite status  
 =    
Subsequently, we analyze BKM decision-making process by examining the composition of 
the board member’s elite status in BKM.  
Although every BKM consists of 9-14 board members, the UPP2 impact evaluation survey 
only interviewed three BKM members: one male member, one female member, and one 
coordinator. As a result, the elite index can only be computed for the three available BKM 
members. Using this information, the possibility of elite status composition in every BKM 
can be described as follows in Table 1.1: 
 
Table 1.1 The composition of elite status of BKM members 




i 1 ) 1 1 
Heterogeneously high (Hthi 1 ) 1 0 
Heterogeneously low (Htli 1 ) 0 0 
Homogeneously low (Hmli 0 ) 0 0 
Note: Based on the information from three BKM members. 
 
Based on this, we classify each BKM into four types of BKM based on the composition of 
elite status hold by the members and include these categories in the empirical model as 
dummy variables. Hmhi  (Hmli) is a dummy variable for BKM for which all sampled members 
have homogeneously high (low) elite status. While Hthi (Htli
(1.1)
 ) is a dummy variable for BKM 
with the majority of board members have high (low) elite status. Including these dummy 
variables in the model, equation 




In equation (1.2), elite capture exists when 𝛿2 and/or 𝛿3 is negative, that is if BKM has more 
board members with elite status, the lower the share of private good projects received by 
community i.  
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As the dependent variable is in fraction and continues, with values bounded between 0 and 1, 
estimating the model with a logit or probit method will produce an unnecessarily transformed 
dependent variable into binary form (zero or one). Moreover, using the OLS estimator would 
be incorrect and not be constant through the entire range that the predicted value is more 
likely to have values outside the range of zero to one. Therefore, equation (1.1) and equation 
 
(1.2) are estimated using the fractional logit method as suggested by Papke and Wooldridge 
(1996). Using this method, the model extends the generalized linear model (GLM) and shows 
that the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) is a consistent estimator, as long as the 
assumption of the conditional mean function is correctly specified.  
1.4 Data  
This study combines two data sets from the Monitoring Information System (MIS) and the 
Impact Evaluation Survey (IES), both collected by the World Bank. The MIS is a web-based 
information system that reports project’s deliverables, while the IES contains kelurahan level 
information gathered from several respondents: household members, BKM members, 
kelurahan head, the local activist, etc. Combining the MIS and IES using the survey code and 
the kelurahan name, this study is able to match 154 kelurahan for the empirical analysis.10
 
 
1.4.1 Monitoring Information System 
The Monitoring Information System data (MIS) report information about the project 
deliverables in every UPP2 kelurahan. The data contain both the number and the cost of 
projects received by every community, which is further classified into several programs. In 
the report, the MIS data begin by classifying the accomplished projects based on the 
disbursement mechanism: revolving fund projects and non-revolving fund projects. In the 
later mechanism, the recipients were required to repay the loans at low interest rates to 
maintain the project’s cash flow. Table 1.2 describes the UPP2 project classification based on 
the MIS data. Each project mechanism is broken down into three general sectors: 
                                                 
10 The MIS data contain 2,059 kelurahan while the UPP2 impact evaluation data contains of 256 kelurahan 
where 98 of them are control kelurahan. Fort the purpose of this study, we only use the treatment kelurahan.  
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infrastructure, social, and economic sector where every sector is further classified into several 
programs.  
 
Table 1.2 Classification of UPP2 projects based on MIS data 
Sector           Program  Program description 
Infrastructure 
Roads/bridges New construction or rehabilitation of roads/bridges. 
House improvement Construction or rehabilitation of residential house. 
Public sanitation Drainage, public toilets, garbage/waste facilities for community level. 
Public utilities Construction or rehabilitation of community’s clean waterways, water tank, public lighting, etc. 
Infrastructure - others Infrastructure related projects that do not fit the above criteria. 
Social 
Trainings Support for trainings or informal education to improve the poor’s skill. 
Social assistance 
Grant assistance to the specific individuals identified as being the most 
vulnerable, which include the support for orphan, elderly, the poor, in the 
form of scholarships, health care, etc. 
Social - others Social related projects that do not fit the above criteria. 
Economic 
Home industry Small scale manufacturing support (i.e. small scale shoes factory, clothing, handbags, pottery, etc. 
Micro retail Petty trade support, such as selling cooked/fresh food, services such as electronics repair, tailoring, etc.  
Economic - others Economic related projects that do not fit the above criteria. 
 
In Figure 1.1, the distribution of UPP2 projects is presented where the number and the cost of 
projects are described in the left and right panel, respectively. It can be seen that the number 
and cost of microfinance programs are the largest, followed by road/bridge program and 
social assistance. These programs were delivered by using two mechanisms: non-revolving 
fund and revolving fund. Figure 1.1 shows that most of the revolving fund projects fall under 
economic sectors (96 percent), particularly in the form of microcredit loans for community 
groups, which usually used to finance income generation activities, such as petty trade, selling 
cooked/fresh food, and services such as electronics repair, tailoring, and small-scale 













Notes: Calculated based on 2,059 kelurahan in MIS data. The project costs in million rupiah. 
 
For the purpose of this study, we focus to the analysis in the following way. First, we focus 
on the distribution of non-revolving fund projects, since the targeting of the revolving-fund 
projects may be biased to the non-poor. Nonetheless, we will also incorporate the revolving-
fund projects for robustness checks that will be explained in the later part of this paper. 
Second, as we define the incidence of elite capture when a community receives a lower 
proportion of private good projects rather than public good projects, we classify UPP2 
programs into private and public good projects. Private good projects consist of social 
assistance, training, housing improvement, and the support for the unemployed to start small 
businesses, while public good projects consist of road/bridge, public sanitation and public 
utilities.11 In the third strategy, we use the cost of projects rather than the number of projects 
to compute the share of private good projects received by every community. Although the 
quantity of projects received by every kelurahan is a reliable measurement to analyze the 
pattern of project allocation made by every BKM, but it does not reflect the actual project 
scale and therefore is incomparable across projects and kelurahans.12
                                                 
11 For instance, the construction of a road/bridge intended to open access to poor households in a remote area 
will not only benefit the poor but also households located around the road/bridge. 
  
12 Araujo et al. (2008) only use project quantity data as the project funding data for Social Fund investment 
projects in Ecuador is unreliable.  
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1.4.2 Impact Evaluation Survey 
The second data source of this study comes from the Impact Evaluation Survey (IES), which 
was conducted to measure the impact of UPP2 on poverty reduction. Designed as a quasi-
experimental survey, the data collection was conducted in three rounds: baseline (2004), 
midterm (2005-2006), and final (2007). For the purpose of our analysis, we utilized the 
baseline and midterm rounds, which contain community information from the time before the 
program took place, and immediately after BKM institution was established but prior to the 
funding disbursement. 
In the sample design, the IES used the regression discontinuity method to select the control 
and treatment kelurahan. The treatment sample was selected using the poverty score 
computed at the sub-district level, where the richest 20 percent of sub-districts were excluded. 
Using regression discontinuity, the kelurahan located in sub-districts with a poverty score 
slightly above the cut-off were assigned as control sample, while kelurahan located in sub-
districts with poverty scores slightly below the cut-off were assigned as treatment sample. 
Given the objective of this study, we only focus on the treatment sample.  
In the baseline survey, 32 households in every kelurahan were randomly chosen for the 
enumerator to collect information from one adult male and one adult female.13
Immediately after BKM was established, the midterm data were collected. In this survey, an 
additional module was given to all 1,920 BKM board members to record their socio-
demographic backgrounds, such as gender, education, employment status, etc. Of the 1,920 
BKM members interviewed, the survey randomly selected three BKM members (one female, 
  The survey 
gathered socio-demographic information about household members, as well as household 
expenditure and the social network of the two adults. Information on food and non-food 
expenditure of every household are used to compute kelurahan average consumption and 
inequality measurements.  
                                                 
13 The UPP2 sampling design can be described as follows. Strata are defined by provinces where 10 out of 12 
UPP2 provinces that have a list of treatment and control sub-districts were selected. From each stratum, 42 UPP2 
sub-districts that have both treatment and control sub-districts were randomly selected as the treatment sample, 
while 29 control samples were representatively selected. In each control and treatment sub-district, half of the 
total number of communities was randomly selected, resulting in 98 control communities and 157 treatment 
communities. In each selected kelurahan, the survey carried out the household questionnaire in four 
neighborhoods, one the neighborhood in which the kelurahan office is located, and the other three randomly 
selected. Finally, 32 households were randomly selected in every kelurahan. 
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one male and one BKM coordinator) to collect information on per capita expenditure and 
their social networks. The sample design of UPP2 is presented in Table 1.3. 
 
Table 1.3 Sampling framework 
Respondents Module 
      Total sample 
Baseline Midterm 
    
Head of kelurahan Community profile 159 154 
    
Households Ethnicity, language, etc. 5,046 4,588 
All household members Demographic variables 23,192 - 
Two adults in a household  Consumption and social network 9,447 8,239 
    
All BKM members  Demographic variables - 1,920 
Three selected BKM members  Consumption and social network - 420 
 
The descriptive statistics of the control variables for the empirical analysis are presented in 
Table 1.4. The average monthly per capita consumption of UPP2 sample is 219,264 rupiah, 
which is a little less than the calculation of SUSENAS 2003, which is 225,916 rupiah. 
Furthermore, the average Gini coefficient of UPP2 sample is 0.33, similar to the Gini 
coefficient of urban areas in Indonesia calculated by SUSENAS 2003 (SEADI, 2013). This 
Gini index, which measures the extent to which the distribution of consumption among 
households deviates from a perfectly equal distribution, is our main variable to capture the 
distribution of power in the community. Additionally, we also calculate alternative inequality 
measurements, such as the deciles dispersion ratio, the GE index and the Atkinson index, for 
further sensitivity checks.  
 
Table 1.4 Descriptive statistics of the variables used 
Variable Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Mean per capita consumption (in rupiah) 219,264 198,121 94.28 
Population 5,821 4,647 3,817 
Number of Mosques 6 5 5.5 
Access to public electricity 0.96 1.00 0.12 
Distance to central bus station (in minutes) 14.95 10.00 13.33 
P 2.76 8050 2.51 1.67 
P 5.62 8020 4.84 3.76 
Gini index 0.33 0.32 0.09 
GE index 0.20 1.62 0.16 
Atkinson index 0.17 0.15 0.17 




Table 1.5 Comparison between BKM members and the general population 
Characteristics BKM members General population 
Age 42.83 39.02 
Female 0.19 0.51 
Married 0.91 0.69 
Muslim 0.91 0.92 
Employed 0.80 0.53 
Hours work per week 41.69 44.55 
Years of schooling 13.00 9.32 
Education category 0  0.00 0.00 
Education category 1 0.03 0.34 
Education category 2 0.08 0.18 
Education category 3 0.46 0.35 
Education category 4 0.42 0.13 
Social network 0.63 0.92 
Per capita consumption  395,460 207,945 
N (individuals) 1,920 15,073 
Notes: Age below 18 is dropped, as UPP2 restricts BKM member below 18. Category 0 means never had been in school, 1 for primary 
school, 2 for junior high school, 3 for senior high, and 4 for university/diploma.  
 
The board member’s consumption level is measured 
using 462 samples, where outliers and zero values were dropped. 
 
As BKM institution is the entry point of the CDD approach, we are interested in comparing 
the characteristics of BKM members and the general population that are eligible to be elected 
as a BKM member. Table 1.5 shows that BKM members are overwhelmingly male, and 
coming from the top of community’s socioeconomic distribution. Although a 30 percent quota 
was the target for women in BKM, only 19 percent of BKM members are females, compared 
to 51 percent in the general population. Furthermore, the board members spent on average 13 
years in school, while for the general population, it is only 9.32 years. It can be seen that 
around 46 percent of BKM board members have a diploma degree, while only 13 percent of 
the general population who do. In terms of per capita consumption, 83 percent of BKM 
members come from the high consumption group, compared to only 26 percent in the general 
population.14 Furthermore, we define social network as a percentage of people in the local 
government or local institution that an individual knows personally. The table shows that 92 
percent of BKM members are networked using this definition, higher than the 63 percent 
reported by the general population.15
                                                 
14 The calculation of per capita consumption is based on the baseline survey, where the expenditure of the board 
members at baseline was predicted. Assuming that assets would not vary significantly between baseline and 
midterm survey, general population’s expenditure at baseline is estimated using their assets information. Then, 
the estimated coefficients are used to predict the expenditure of board members at the baseline survey, using 
their assets information collected at the midterm’ survey. In this study, we use the consumption per capita at the 
baseline survey because these were not yet affected by the program. 
 From the comparison, it appears that high qualified 
community members were chosen as BKM members. 
15 For BKM members, the social network variable was collected when they are available at the midterm survey, 
while for non-members, at the baseline. Obviously, one can argue that BKM board members have higher social 
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1.5 Estimation results  
Table 1.6 presents the estimation result of the specification (1.1), which examines the 
relationship between kelurahan inequality and the portion of the budget allocated to private 
good projects. The regression results show that inequality is significant and negatively 
associated with the dependent variable, which implies that, the more unequal a community’s 
consumption, the smaller the share of private good projects. Thus, this finding supports the 
hypothesis that elite capture is more likely to exist in an unequal power distribution setting. 
To ensure the result consistency, we use several inequality measures with different 
sensitivities in different parts of the distribution. In column 1 and 2 of Table 1.6, we use the 
deciles dispersion ratio, which is the ratio of the average consumption of the richest group 
divided by the average consumption of the poorest, useful for a small sample as in our case. In 
column 1 we use P8020 or the ratio of the average richest 20 percent divided by the average 
poorest 20 percent. The econometric result shows that one standard deviation increases in 
P8020 is associated with a 0.029 times standard deviation reduction on the probability of 
receiving a higher share of private projects. Nevertheless, using deciles dispersion ratio P8020 
might neglect the information of households located in the middle of the distribution. 
Therefore, in column 2 we use another deciles dispersion ratio P8050
Nevertheless, we acknowledge the threat of potential endogeneity issues that may generate 
biased parameter estimates. The first is the possibility that there is an unobserved 
heterogeneity that might affect BKM selection process, which would then affect the 
probability of a BKM member getting elected as well as the project choice simultaneously. 
We try to limit this problem through our comprehensive set of control variables, as well as 
, or the ratio of the 
average 20 percent richest divided by the median’s consumption. The inclusion of this 
inequality measurement also gives a negative and significant effect, although its magnitude is 
higher and more significant. Finally, we also consider the problem of vulnerability in extreme 
values and outliers in the distribution. In column 3 to 5 we include inequality measures with 
axiomatic foundations, namely the Gini index, the general entropy index (GE) and the 
Atkinson index. Still, the coefficients of inequality measurements remain negative and 
significant. 
                                                                                                                                                        
network through the participation in the UPP2, and therefore may cause an endogeneity issue. However, the 
types of local activists listed in the questionnaire were those whom respondents were unlikely to meet through 
the UPP2, as the project was specifically designed to be less connected with the governmental structures to 
guarantee its independency. 
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district fixed effects. The second endogeneity threat might arise from the reverse causality 
issue. However, we argue that this reverse relationship is unlikely as the main independent 
variable, community inequality, is predetermined before the project takes place.  
As for the control variables, we include access to public services to capture the pre-existing 
public goods available, which were exogenously provided by the government prior to the 
initiation of UPP2. The variable distance to the nearest central bus station is our proxy for 
road access. This variable is positive and statistically significant. It implies that greater access 
to the nearest central bus station is associated with a lower share of private good projects 
received. We would expect that the better the access to public goods, the higher the allocation 
that can be spent for private good projects. However, our data analysis suggested the opposite 
effect, signaling a project mis-targeting. Furthermore, we also include the number of mosques 
as one of the control variables because Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world. 
Rao (2005) describes the important role of mosques as “symbolic public goods” in collective 
action, which is vital to generate the common knowledge and build a sense of community. 
Mosques in Indonesia are often used to host development activities, providing a venue for 
community meetings, discussions about community’s development, and to provide public 
announcement. In line with this argument, the estimation results show that the higher the 
number the mosques, the higher the likelihood to receive pro-poor projects.  
Of the remaining independent variables, kelurahan mean consumption is strongly positive and 
significant, which means that the share of private projects is higher in better off kelurahan. 
One could assume that higher rates of poverty would generate more private projects. Yet, our 
econometric results show a different pattern. Holding other variables constant, lower mean 
consumption is associated with fewer private projects, which again flag possible targeting 
problems of UPP2. Alternatively, it may suggest that in richer communities, there is less 
competition for these funds, which then allowing the poor to access a greater share. 
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Table 1.6 Determinants of receiving private projects as the proportion of the total non-revolving projects 
 Community inequality Composition of board members in BKM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
          Mean of per capita consumption (log) 0.454*** 0.389*** 0.437*** 0.406*** 0.478*** 0.497*** 0.419*** 0.485*** 0.442*** 0.526*** 
 (2.816) (2.738) (2.942) (2.692) (3.060) (2.989) (2.866) (3.114) (2.838) (3.248) 
Population (log) -0.248 -0.237 -0.225 -0.240 -0.235 -0.210 -0.197 -0.187 -0.200 -0.197 
 (-1.187) (-1.144) (-1.087) (-1.150) (-1.137) (-1.060) (-1.005) (-0.953) (-1.016) (-1.007) 
Distance to central bus station (minutes) 0.005* 0.005* 0.005** 0.005* 0.005** 0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 
 (1.886) (1.878) (2.109) (1.839) (2.055) (1.755) (1.772) (1.949) (1.722) (1.890) 
Number of mosques 0.016** 0.016** 0.016** 0.016** 0.017** 0.015* 0.015* 0.016** 0.015* 0.016** 
 (2.138) (2.148) (2.309) (2.169) (2.356) (1.795) (1.828) (1.961) (1.822) (1.994) 
P -0.029** 8020     -0.030***     
 (-2.521)     (-2.596) 
 
    
P  8050 -0.059**     -0.059**    
  (-2.334)     (-2.405) 
 
   
Gini index   -1.320**     -1.381***   
   (-2.519)     (-2.658) 
 
  
GE index    -0.585**     -0.589***  
    (-2.550)     (-2.611) 
 
 
Atkinson index     -1.469***     -1.530*** 
     (-2.795)     (-2.954) 
 Homogenous and high status      -0.239 -0.217 -0.260 -0.218 -0.256 
      (-1.154) (-1.036) (-1.169) (-1.028) (-1.175) 
Homogenous and low status      0.157* 0.157* 0.151* 0.158* 0.153* 
      (1.931) (1.913) (1.851) (1.932) (1.881) 
Heterogeneous and high status      0.010 0.025 -0.006 0.011 -0.004 
      (0.104) (0.259) (-0.066) (0.111) (-0.040) 
Number of observations 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 
AIC 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.29 
BIC -599.25 -599.24 -599.25 -599.22 -599.27 -584.33 -584.32 -584.34 -548.30 -584.37 
           
The dependent variable is the share of the project budget allocated to private non-revolving fund projects per total cost of the non-revolving projects. The results are obtained using a fractional logit method. T-
values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Constants are not reported. The estimation also controls for the amount of UPP2 fund received by the community and access to public electricity. Districts 




1.5.1 The composition of BKM members and project selection  
The second objective of this study is to examine whether the bargaining power of the board 
members in BKM decision-making process, influences the budget allocation towards private 
good projects. To do this, in Table 1.7 we first estimate the probability of getting elected to 
BKM by pooling individual data of both BKM and non-BKM members (household samples). 
The results suggest that BKM members are significantly more educated, have more per capita 
consumption and more social connectedness. Further controlling for individual characteristics, 
such as gender, age, and Muslim dummy variable, column 2 in Table 1.7 shows that BKM 
members are more likely to be older (with non-linear pattern), male, and Muslim. 
 
Table 1.7 Logistic regressions: determinants of community organization membership 
 (1) (2) 
   
Years of schooling 0.308*** 0.308*** 
 (14.612) (14.170) 
Per capita consumption (log) 1.131*** 1.012*** 
 (12.131) (10.168) 
Social network 8.173*** 8.233*** 
 (17.818) (17.441) 
Age  0.302** 
  (8.909) 
Age squared  -0.003** 
  (-7.854) 
Female  -0.647*** 
  (-5.192) 
Muslim  0.867*** 
  (3.839) 
The dependent variable is the probability that a person is elected as a BKM member. T-values in the parenthesis. ***p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The results of Table 1.7 suggest that variable years of schooling, per capita consumption and 
social network, are the prominent factors that determine the bargaining power of BKM 
members in decision-making process. Based on this, we use these three factors together to 
construct an elite index using the first principal component. On the basis of the composition 
of BKM members’ elite index, we classify each BKM institution into one of four BKM 
categories, which indicate the process of bargaining power inside BKM, namely 
homogeneously high status (Hmhi), homogeneously low status (Hmli), heterogeneously high 
status (Hthi), or heterogeneously low status (Htli
District fixed effect 
).  
Yes Yes 
Number of observations 14,335 14,331 
Pseudo R2 0.37 0.43 
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These BKM categories are then included in the model specification as additional dummy 
variables (Table 1.6 column 6 to 10). For instance, the dummy variable “homogeneously high 
(low) status” takes the value of 1 if all (none) of the sampled BKM members have elite status 
and 0 otherwise. While BKM dummy variable “heterogeneously high (low) status” takes the 
value of 1 if the majority of the sampled BKM members have high (low) status and 0 
otherwise. 
Comparing columns 1 to 5 and columns 6 to 10 of Table 1.6, it seems that the inclusion of 
BKM dummy variables does not change the results that inequality variables remain negative 
and significant. Nevertheless, BKM dummy variable “homogenously low status” is 
significant, compared to the left-out category: This result suggests that the allocation of 
private good projects is more likely in kelurahan where all sampled BKM members have no 
elite status.  
Furthermore, we explore the link between the elite status of BKM members with the 
characteristics of residents and the community where BKM members are living in. Table 1.8 
compares the characteristics of BKM members with the general population, and the 
community characteristics based on four BKM categories. 
 
Table 1.8 Summary characteristics by BKM type 











     
 BKM members characteristics    
Consumption per capita (rupiah)  806,559 457,460 412,892 288,238 
Years of education 15.6 14.79 13.44 12.5 
Social networks 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.91 
     
 General population characteristics    
Consumption per capita (rupiah) 214,990 240,524 219,230 204,581 
Years of education 10.1 9.7 9.2 9.2 
Social networks 0.64 0.67 0.64 0.60 
     
 Community characteristics    
Population 4,775 6,018 5,709 5,923 
Access to public electricity 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.93 
Distance to central bus station (minutes) 9.00 12.89 15.79 15.96 
Number of mosques 6 6 7 6 
Total UPP2 fund (million rupiah) 230 256 248 272 
Gini index 0.30 0.34 0.34 0.32 
GE index 0.19 0.22 0.20 0.18 
Atkinson index 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.15 
P8020 4.45 6.29 5.68 5.15 
P8050 2.54 3.19 2.74 2.49 
Number of BKM 5 36 63 50 
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Based on Table 1.8, it interestingly appears that the board members who have position in 
“homogeneously low” BKM have on average the lowest per capita consumption, the lowest 
years of education and the lowest social networks.16
 
 However, when focusing on the 
characteristics of the residents who live in the same kelurahan as the “homogeneously low” 
BKM, it appears that the local residents have on average the lowest consumption, lowest 
years of education and lowest social network. It is also shown that BKM members sitting in 
“homogeneously low” BKM are living in the poorest kelurahan with the worst access to 
electricity and transportation, signaling that in kelurahan where BKM members 
homogeneously have no elite status, the boards still prioritize the private good projects even 
though the pre-existence of public goods is low. These findings imply that when BKM 
members share similar characteristics with the poor, they have within-community affinity, and 
thus engage in altruistic behavior by giving higher preference to private good projects. 
1.5.2 Robustness checks 
For robustness checks, we examine how communities favor non-revolving and revolving 
mechanism projects. As mentioned in the earlier part of this paper, the revolving fund projects 
are targeted to the non-poor, yet expected to provide indirect multiplier effects to the poor. 
Thus, for robustness checks we alternatively define the dependent variable as the ratio of 
housing programs, social programs, and economic programs that were given under non-
revolving mechanism as a share of total project costs (revolving plus non-revolving projects). 
Table 1.9 repeats the key regressions of Table 1.6 and show a similar pattern although with 
smaller coefficient magnitude and weaker significances.  
                                                 
16 This clearly makes sense since the computation of elite index is based on these three variables. 
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Table 1.9 Robustness check using alternative dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the share of UPP2 budget allocated to private non-revolving fund projects per total project cost. The results are obtained using the fractional logit. T-Values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constants are not reported. The estimation also controls for the amount of UPP2 fund received by community; interaction between population and the amount of UPP2 fund received, and access to 
public electricity. District fixed effects are included. 
 Community inequality  Composition of board members in BKM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Mean of per capita consumption (log) 0.373*** 0.324** 0.305** 0.323** 0.342**  0.404*** 0.346*** 0.339** 0.350** 0.377*** 
 (2.641) (2.539) (2.286) (2.418) (2.460)  (2.756) (2.584) (2.396) (2.497) (2.588) 
Population (log) -0.253* -0.244 -0.235 -0.245 -0.241  -0.222 -0.212 -0.204 -0.213 -0.211 
 (-1.660) (-1.608) (-1.549) (-1.605) (-1.595)  (-1.534) (-1.470) (-1.420) (-1.474) (-1.470) 
Distance to central bus station (minutes) 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006***  0.005** 0.006** 0.006** 0.005** 0.006** 
 (2.737) (2.730) (2.705) (2.681) (2.725)  (2.532) (2.558) (2.525) (2.498) (2.523) 
Number of mosques 0.014** 0.014** 0.013** 0.013** 0.014**  0.013* 0.013* 0.012* 0.013* 0.013* 
 (1.992) (1.996) (2.006) (1.988) (2.062)  (1.699) (1.721) (1.709) (1.692) (1.759) 
P -0.020** 8020      -0.020**     
 (-2.389)      (-2.504)     
P  8050 -0.040**      -0.039**    
  (-2.408)      (-2.479)    
Gini index   -0.605      -0.628   
   (-1.360)      (-1.432)   
GE index    -0.359**      -0.356**  
    (-2.104)      (-2.166)  
Atkinson index     -0.769*      -0.794* 
     (-1.702)      (-1.806) 
Homogenous and high status       -0.142 -0.126 -0.144 -0.126 -0.146 
       (-0.994) (-0.881) (-0.944) (-0.865) (-0.961) 
Homogenous and low status       0.122* 0.122* 0.119* 0.122* 0.119* 
       (1.825) (1.816) (1.774) (1.827) (1.781) 
Heterogeneous and high status       -0.002 0.008 -0.013 -0.002 -0.012 
       (-0.029) (0.100) (-0.156) (-0.029) (-0.147) 
Number of observations 153 153 153 153 153  153 153 153 153 153 
AIC 1.113 1.113 1.114 1.114 1.114  1.152 1.152 1.152 1.152 1.152 
BIC -601.54 -601.54 -601.51 -601.52 -601.52  -586.52 -586.52 -586.49 -586.50 -586.50 




Currently, community-driven development approach has been used in delivering many 
poverty programs based on the presumption that it may foster sustained poverty reduction 
through social inclusion. However, recent literature has shown that such an approach may 
increase the risk of elite capture, particularly in more unequal communities where the gap 
between non-poor and poor is more severe. 
In this study, we empirically examine the existence of elite capture within the Urban Poverty 
Project 2, a nationwide CDD program implemented in Indonesia. Classifying types of 
poverty programs into private good projects and public good projects which could be 
translated into pro-poor and less pro-poor projects, our results suggest that the incidence of 
elite capture is more likely to occur in unequal communities. Furthermore, the econometric 
analysis demonstrates that the composition of representatives in the local body matter for the 
allocation of pro-poor projects. Constructing elite status index based on the combination of 
level of education, consumption, and social connectedness, we find that only when local 
representatives closely share characteristics with the poor, does altruistic behavior exist and 
thus project decision favor the poor. 
These findings are relevant to the hundreds of CDD programs currently in operation in 
developing countries. It does not necessarily imply that participatory approach is not 
working. Instead, we suggest policy makers to put more attention on the resilience of the 
local power structure, the decision-making process, and the consequent need for pro-poor 




2 Do bribes get the officials off your back? 
 
Abstract 
This paper tests the “grease the wheels” hypothesis of corruption, by examining the impact 
of bribes on the effectiveness of public service delivery. Using data from 470 firms in 
Indonesia, the econometric analysis suggests a view inconsistent with the hypothesis: firms 
that pay higher bribes experiencing a higher share of managerial time spent with public 
officials, not less. In the context of the competitive bribery with asymmetric information, 
where the average amount of bribes needed to reduce bureaucracy is unknown for firms, this 














Corruption occurs when public officials misuse their power for private gain. This abuse of 
power happens when officials sell government property for their own benefit, give kickbacks 
in public procurement, accept bribes, embezzle government funds, or participate in 
patronage or nepotism. Although the impact of corruption on development may vary, most 
economists view it as a major obstacle to development (Mauro, 1995; Tanzi and Davoodi 
2002; Meon and Sekkat, 2005). Macro studies have highlighted that corruption weakens 
institutions and distorts competition, and thereby reduces private investment and lowers 
growth. Pioneering the quantitative research on corruption, Mauro (1995) finds that a 
reduction of the corruption index by one standard deviation increases the growth rate by 
about 0.8 points. 
The view that corruption is detrimental to growth, however, is not shared by all economists, 
as some argue that corruption can actually be efficiency enhancing. This view is known as 
the “grease the wheels” hypothesis. Motivated by Leff (1964) and elaborated by Leys (1965) 
and Huntington (1968), the hypothesis proposes that corruption can be beneficial in 
countries with poor governance and cumbersome bureaucracy. Huntington (1968) states: “In 
terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, over-centralized, 
dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over-centralized, honest bureaucracy.” The 
hypothesis implies that if an inefficient bureaucracy is a barrier to economic activity, 
“grease” money may speed up the rigid administration. Lui (1985) offers an illustration in 
the context of customer lines and demonstrates that when bribes are regarded as legal 
payment, they can significantly reduce the time spent standing in line. 
However, the “grease the wheels” idea may not work, given the complexity of a bribery 
transaction. It is illegal and hidden, and therefore it is uncertain whether the corrupt official 
will credibly commit to an agreement made during the transaction. A corrupt official may 
deliberately impose administrative delays in order to attract further bribes (Myrdal, 1968; 
Andvig, 1991). A number of empirical studies even reveal a “sand the wheels” effect of 
corruption. For instance, firm-level analyses find a positive relationship between amounts of 
money spent on bribes and the bureaucratic burden, proxied by the percentage of managerial 
time spent with officials to deal with regulations (Kaufmann and Wei, 1999; Henderson and 
Kuncoro, 2004; Fisman and Gatti, 2006). They show that firms that pay more money in 
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bribes spend more, not less, managerial time with public officials. These empirical 
contributions thus have provided an important alternative insight to the “grease the wheels” 
hypothesis.  
Nevertheless, these studies do not take into account the potential reverse causality 
relationship that may exist between the two key variables: amount spent on bribes and time 
spent with officials to deal with bureaucracy. Ignoring this issue may result in inconsistent 
parameters and therefore misleading conclusions. In this study, I use two survey rounds of 
MICI data (Monitoring Investment Climate Indicators), which contain information on the 
experiences of 470 firms in dealing with bureaucrats in Indonesia. Given the advantage of 
the panel data structure, the lagged value of bribes is used to instrument the current bribes. 
Since the chosen instrumental variable is predetermined, applying the 2SLS approach may 
give a consistent parameter. Taking this into account, the results of this study further confirm 
the positive relationship between bribery and managerial time spent with officials. In this 
respect, these results complement previous analyses of Kaufmann and Wei (1999), 
Henderson and Kuncoro (2004), and Fisman and Gatti (2006). The second contribution of 
this paper with respect to the literature is the assessment of the “grease the wheels” 
hypothesis in the context of competitive bribery and imperfect information. To my 
knowledge, this paper represents the first attempt to empirically test the “grease the wheels” 
hypothesis using this framework.  
In a competitive bribery setting, firms need to compete to obtain the favors from the 
government, such as the issuance of scarce government licenses. In this situation, a bribe-
maximizing official may act as a monopolist, limiting the licenses, but never reveals the 
selection criteria to obtain the license. Similar to a sealed auction, each firm thus will offer a 
bribe amount based on their beliefs regarding how much their competitors have paid, making 
the average amount of bribes needed to get the government goods unknown. On the other 
hand, a corrupt official, who has full information regarding the bribes paid by each firm as 
well as firm characteristics, can estimate the expected bribe value of each firm. This paper 
shows that when a firm pays a higher amount of bribes than the average bribe, officials 
might identify the specific firm as a “weak” firm that is less reluctant to pay large bribes, and 
therefore shall face further bureaucratic delays. 
To support these conclusions, the remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
presents a selective overview of related corruption literature and the testable hypotheses used 
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in this study. Section 3 describes the estimation method. Section 4 presents data and some 
descriptive analysis. Section 5 presents the results and discussion, and section 6 concludes 
the study. 
 
2.2 Literature review and hypothesis 
In a seminal paper on corruption, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) present a model in which the 
government is the sole producer of a homogeneous government good and an official acts as 
the supplier of this good. As a supplier, the official has the opportunity to restrict the slots of 
the government good, by creating a long delay or imposing further requirements. In this 
case, the “grease the wheels” hypothesis suggests that bribes can be considered as speed 
money that may eliminate such bureaucratic delays. Lui (1985) formalizes this mechanism 
by setting a single-line queue model in the context of customer lines. He shows that when 
bribes are considered as legal payments, faster service can be awarded by the organizers on 
the basis of the bribe’s size, which reflects the customer’s time valuation and therefore the 
customer’s willingness to pay. 
Although “the grease the wheels” hypothesis may sound appealing, one strand of literature 
argues that larger bribes do not necessarily circumvent bureaucracy. In the case of speed 
money, Myrdal (1968) argues that the secrecy surrounding bribery scheme results in a more 
complex bribery system, where corrupt officials may deliberately cause administrative 
delays in order to attract more bribes. Andvig (1991) further points out that in the case of the 
customer queue, organizers may evaluate the line to test the participants’ willingness to pay, 
and thereby increase the average waiting time. In most cases, standing in line only happens 
when there is a long processing time. 
A number of empirical studies also support the alternative view of “the grease the wheels” 
hypothesis. Kaufmann and Wei (1999) develop a model in which effective bureaucratic 
harassment (proxied by the amount of time spent with bureaucracy) is endogenous, as 
officials have the ability to customize red tape. Their model predicts that firms that pay more 
bribes not only face more imposed regulations, but also have to deal with more effective 
bureaucratic harassment. Using firm-level data from three global surveys, their results show 
that firms that pay more bribes experience more wasted time with officials. Henderson and 
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Kuncoro (2004) adapt the Kaufmann and Wei (1999) model and use firm-level data from 
1,808 firms to estimate the key aspects of corruption, i.e. bribes, time spent with officials, 
and different forms of regulation. They find that both bribes and time rise strongly with 
different forms of bureaucratic harassment. Although the authors struggle with endogeneity 
issues, they show a significant positive relationship between bribes and the share of 
managerial time spent with officials, arguing that officials tend to nurture good relationships 
with their best “customers”. Fisman and Gatti (2006) use firm-level data across countries 
and further confirm the positive correlation between bribery and the amount of time spent 
with bureaucracy.  
To date, the available firm-level empirical studies show no support for the “grease the 
wheels” hypothesis. The data suggest that larger bribes may increase the managerial time 
spent with government officials to expedite business, because public officials may customize 
the rules and regulations to further collect the firm’s surplus. Given the explanation, this 
study hypothesizes that: higher spending on bribes is associated with increased 
management time spent with officials. 
Furthermore, I examine the “grease the wheels” hypothesis in the context of competitive 
bribery under asymmetric information. In competitive bribery, all firms need to bribe in 
order to gain the attention of government officials; those who refuse to compete will be 
driven out from the market, leaving the most efficient ones to be milked (Bliss and Di Tella, 
1997). In situations where all firms need to pay bribes, and there is only one official that has 
the power to grant or withhold a government good, the official has the position of a 
monopolist. As a result, a corrupt official has an incentive to limit the slots of the 
government good and thus evaluate each firm’s willingness to pay bribes in order to 
maximize bribe revenues. The “grease the wheels” hypothesis would suggest that those who 
are willing and able to pay higher bribes will have a higher priority in getting the slots. 
In the context of perfect information, the amount of bribes paid by every firm represents its 
true value in terms of how much red tape can be reduced by it. However, under asymmetric 
information, a corrupt official never reveals the reward mechanism, making the average 
bribe amount needed to reduce the bureaucracy unknown. Additionally, the firms do not 
know their competitors' bribing capacities. As suggested by the auction theory, each 
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participant independently estimates the value of bribes required to reduce the bureaucracy, 
based on their beliefs about how much their competitors have paid.17
Nevertheless, even though the firms do not know the amounts of bribes offered by their 
competitors, the official who collects and interacts with each firm has all the information on 
bribe distribution as well as firm characteristics. This information allows them to learn and 
estimate the average bribe value, given firm characteristics relative to the other firms in the 
industry (conditional average). Furthermore, the public official may screen firms based on 
the difference between the size of bribes paid and the average bribe. The literature indicates 
that public officials may observe firm characteristics and use this information to decide to 
which firm to grant the government good. Guriev (2004) presents a model in which officials 
use the information produced through red tape to classify types of firm, then sort out those 
firms that do not deserve the government goods. Svensson (2003) illustrates that the corrupt 
official may assess firms according to their ability to pay, which may be reflected in their 
profit margins. In the context of bribes paid by truck drivers at different check points in 
Aceh, Olken and Barron (2009) show that officials use different pricing schemes to extract 
bribes according to driver and truck characteristics, such as the driver’s monthly salary, 
truck age, and tons overweight. 
 
Allocation efficiency would suggest that the firms that pay bribes higher than the average 
should be able to obtain the government goods ahead of the others. However, firms that pay 
higher than average bribes might also signal that they are less reluctant to pay high bribes. 
These firms may be those in need of government goods, or those trying to collude with 
officials (e.g. to hide illegal activities, etc.).18
                                                 
17 Corruption literature mostly discusses the isomorphism between competitive bribery and competitive 
bidding, as proposed by Beck and Maher (1986). In competitive bidding for government purchasing, the 
contract is allocated to the firm submitting the predetermined lowest price (highest bribe), which has been set 
prior to the auction. As the most efficient participant who offers the highest bribe always wins, allocation 
efficiency is always maintained. However, inefficiency may result if the official is influenced by considerations 
other than just the bribe’s size, such as favoritism (Bardhan, 1997; Clark and Riis, 2000). 
 A corrupt official might identify these firms as 
the “weak” ones and can be more aggressive in approaching them.  As a result, a corrupt 
official further delays the bureaucracy for these firms, which may take the form of informing 
18 There is anecdotal evidence in Indonesia that public officials from lower ranks tend to collude with firms that 
hide illegal activities by allowing exports without permits, overlooking tax evasion, etc. Smith et al. (2003) 
confidentially interviewed timber industry actors in Indonesia. They show that bribery exacerbates illegal 
logging, making it unlikely that firms will be controlled or punished. 
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other corrupt officials about the “catch“ so that further bureaucracy can be imposed.19
 
 This 
leads to the second hypothesis of this paper: firms that pay higher than average bribes 
will spend more time dealing with government officials. 
2.3 Empirical strategy 
This study examines how the share of managerial time spent with officials changes in 
response to changes in bribes value. The following panel model is estimated: 
 
 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2.1) 
 
The subscripts denote firm i in survey period t. Dependent variable Time is the percentage of 
managerial time spent with government officials to expedite bureaucracy. Time is high when 
bureaucrats decide to restrict the supply of government goods, i.e. delaying license issuance, 
imposing many requirements, prolonging negotiations with firms regarding rules and 
regulations, etc. In the survey, the following question is given to the respondents: On 
average, what percent of total company management time was spent with government 
officials as regulators (law makers, not governments as clients) to expedite business over the 
last six months? The respondents were provided with six time interval options: (1) < 5 
percent, (2) 5 percent-15 percent, (3) 15 percent-25 percent, (4) 25 percent-50 percent, (5) 50 
percent-75 percent and (6) >75 percent. For the empirical analysis, the answer is recorded as 
2.5 percent for (1), the midpoint values for (2) to (5), and 87.5 percent for (6).  
In equation (2.1), the variable Bribes is the bribe payments as a percentage of total 
production cost. Here, α2 is the parameter of interest, where the efficient grease hypothesis 
would suggest a negative sign of α2: 
                                                 
19 Hunt and Laszlo (2005) shows that the richer the official’s clients, the more frequent and the higher the 
bribes should be, while Hunt (2005) shows empirically that bribery incidence is higher at institutions with 
bribe-prone clients. 
firms paying higher bribes will be granted less time in 
dealing with bureaucrats. In the first survey round, variable Bribes is captured by asking: As 
a percentage of total company production costs in 2004, how much “additional cost” was 
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spent on government bureaucracy to smooth business affairs? _______  percent of company 
production costs.20
Furthermore, Z is a vector of control variables that comprises firm-level characteristics such 
as firm size, age, and other firm-level variables. Firm size is measured as the number of 
employees. The correlation matrix (shown later in this paper) suggests that the correlation 
between time spent with officials and firm size is non-linear. Therefore, the squared value of 
the number of employees is included. The specification also controls for the length of firm 
establishment (age). The firm’s experience with public officials may generate a better 
understanding of government regulations and officials’ behavior. Furthermore, older firms 
may have fulfilled the basic regulation requirements, e.g. business license, building 
certificate, etc., and may only need to deal with the validity maintenance, which will clearly 
influence the amount of time spent with public officials. 
  
The rest of the firm-level variables consist of dummy variables describing whether the firm 
is multinational, has government shareholdings, or has an export-import orientation. 
Multinational companies (foreign ownership) may be more vulnerable to bureaucratic 
predation. They are not only more visible to officials, but also need to fulfill more 
regulations and receive more supervision. In Indonesia, foreign ownership typically 
cooperates with local partners to discourage such harassment (Kuncoro, 2006). 
Multinationals are included in the estimation as a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 for 
a firm with foreign investments and 0 otherwise. Moreover, the model also controls for firms 
with government shareholdings. The correlation matrix suggests that firms with a 
government share spend less time on bureaucracy, although the correlation is not significant. 
This variable is included as a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if a firm has government 
ownership and 0 otherwise. The last control variable is whether a firm has an export or 
import orientation. Firms in this category are manufacturer-exporter firms that usually also 
import their inputs through customs. As the Indonesian customs clearance efficiency index is 
historically low, the category of export-import firms is needed to capture the additional time 
spent clearing goods going through customs. Firms that fall into the export-import category 
are recorded as 1 and as 0 otherwise. Finally, the model includes sector and region fixed 
                                                 
20 In the second round, the year 2004 is changed to 2005. Given that the survey should capture information over 
the last 6 months, enumerators understood that firms should give information exactly 6 months prior to the 
interview taking place. 
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effects to control for further unobservable characteristics. Given the structure of the data, the 
panel model is used to estimate equation (2.1). 
Still, equation (2.1) may suffer from reverse causality that it may be the case that the amount 
of time spent with bureaucrats influences the amounts of bribes paid by firms. In order to 
deal with this issue, variable current bribe (Bribest) is instrumented using the bribe value in 
the previous period (Bribest-1). Given that Bribest-1
 
 is pre-determined, it will not correlate 
with the dependent variable and can be considered as a convincing instrument. Thus, 
estimating equation (2.1) with 2SLS may give a consistent parameter. 
2.3.1 Competitive bribery with asymmetric information 
In the context of the competitive bribery with asymmetric information, this study examines 
whether firms that pay bribes larger than the firm-specific average bribes will influence the 
amount of time spent with public officials. Equation (2.1) is re-formulated as follows: 
 
 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2(𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑠 − 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2.2) 
   
Although the amount of bribes offered by competitors are unknown to firms,  public officials 
do know the bribe distributions as well as the observed firm characteristics relative to bribe 
payments and characteristics of other firms in the industry. Thus, corrupt officials can 
estimate firm-specific average bribes using the following equation: 
 𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃1 + 𝜃2𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2.3) 
   
Estimating equation (2.3) will give the firm-specific average bribe or the expected bribe 
(𝐵𝑟𝚤𝑏𝑒𝑠� ). Thus, the predicted error term (𝜀?̂?𝑡) captures the difference between the bribes paid 
by firms and the firm-specific average bribe: 𝜀𝚤𝑡� = 𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝐵𝑟𝚤𝑏𝑒𝑠𝚤𝑡� .  Applying this to 
equation (2.2), the empirical model reads: 
  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝜀𝚤𝑡� + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2.4) 
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The “grease the wheels” hypothesis would suggest a negative sign of β2, implying that the 
higher the amount of bribes paid compared to the firm-specific average bribes, the lower the 
amount of managerial time spent with public officials. 
 
2.4 Data 
In order to examine the effect of bribe payments on the time spent with officials, this study 
uses firm-level data from the unpublished Monitoring Investment Climate Indicator (MICI). 
The survey was initiated by the World Bank and carried out by the University of Indonesia, 
aiming to regularly monitor the business climate in Indonesia. To do this, the survey has 
been conducted every 6 months since 2005. However, this study only uses the first two 
rounds that are available. 
The first survey round was conducted between February and May in 2005 while the second 
round took place between late November 2005 and mid-March 2006. The survey collects 
information regarding firms’ experience in interacting with the public office and bureaucrats. 
Out of the 600 firms that were visited in the first round, 470 of them were re-interviewed in 
the second round. Additionally, 57 firms were added in the second round as a refresher 
sample. 
Figure 2.1 Sample distribution by location, size, and manufacturing sector 
 
          Note: Small firms have less than 100 workers, medium firms between 100-500 workers, and large firms more  
                                     than 500 workers. 
 
























The survey sampling frame is based on the Manufacturing Firm Directory 2003, published 
by the BPS. After selecting seven large cities on the basis of an industry agglomeration, 
proportional random stratification is performed at the regional level where the city is located. 
Firms with less than 100 workers were excluded from the sample as small firms have a 
different set of regulations.21
It should be noted that corruption data are typically difficult to obtain due to the sensitivity 
of the information provided by the respondent. Therefore, the MICI survey employed several 
data collection strategies to mitigate low responses. First, the survey only interviewed 
managers who have at least a managerial position, as they are the ones who usually deal with 
bureaucrats. Second, the survey was carried out by a known independent academic 
institution, the University of Indonesia. This strategy is important in convincing the 
managers of research independence and data confidentiality. Furthermore, the interviewers 
brought with them a letter from the Indonesian Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs 
that guaranteed data confidentiality on paper. This letter, showing that the central 
government was involved in the survey, did not make firms more reluctant to provide the 
information. On the contrary, direct interviews revealed that firms are heavily fatigued with 
the harassments of public officials, and thus agreed that the survey is a way to report what 
happens on the ground. As the third strategy, the questions in the survey were indirectly 
phrased in order to avoid implying that the respondent was the one who committed a 
crime.
 Moreover, firms in the agricultural and services sectors were 
also excluded, as the regulation constraints in the agricultural sector were relatively minor, 
and there is no reliable data for the services sector. Figure 2.1 shows the sample distribution 
of firms based on location, size and sectors. 
22
 
  For example, on the question of bribe payments, the survey asked: Please give your 
answer on the statement below? “Companies like yours must pay “additional cost” to 
government institution to finish business affairs.” As a result, firms were less hesitant to 
reveal their experiences with bribery. Figure 2.2 illustrates the answer to the above question. 
Most firms admitted that they often paid bribes to public officials, and this usually took 
place either in a public office or during the visits performed by officials. 
                                                 
21 Although the BPS Manufacturing Firms Directory 2003 only contains firms with at least 100 employees, the 
final sample list still contains firms with less than 100 workers, because some firms had made a labor 
adjustment prior to the survey. 
22 A similar approach was also used in the 1998 Ugandan enterprise survey (Svensson, 2003). 
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Figure 2.2 Frequency of bribe payments in the last six month Figure 2.3 Average official visits in the last six months 
 
 
Source: Processed from MICI data 2005-2006. 
Figure 2.3 presents a comparison of the average public officials’ visits from various public 
offices. Typically, the purpose of a public official's visit is to check the validity of 
documents, labor and equipment conditions, standard operations, etc. Figure 2.3 shows that 
there is a general increasing trend in terms of frequency of visits from the first to the second 
survey round. It is also reported that the most frequent visits are from the customs office, 
followed by police/army institutions. Managers stated that the visits from the police / army 
were conducted to “ensure” their commitment to protecting the firm from any potential 
security threats. 






Notes: The bribe group is based on the bribe payments in period 1. Minuscule means the bribe ratio is between 0 and 0. 0.000001 percent; 
very tiny=0.000009-0.0045 percent; tiny=0.005-0.04 percent; very small=0.05-0.8 percent, small=0.9-5 percent; moderate=6-10 percent; 




























































In Figure 2.4, the relationship between bribes and the amount of time spent with public 
officials is presented. On the horizontal axis, firms are classified into one of the eight bribe 
groups based on the firm’s bribes value, from tiny to very high bribe payments. Each data 
point in the figure refers to the mean of the bribes and time spent with officials for every 
bribe group. As both variables are measured as percentages, the vertical axis is measured in 
percentages.  The figure shows a positive relationship between the percentage of bribes paid 
and the percentage of managerial time spent with officials: the higher the bribes paid, the 
higher the share of managerial time spent with officials. Although increasing the bribes 
payment from “moderate” to “high” reduce the time spent with officials in the first round, 
this correlation did not hold in the second survey round. 
 
2.5 Estimation results 
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics.23
Table 2.1
 On average, firms paid 1.79 percent of their total 
production costs on bribery and spent 5.52 percent of total managerial time dealing with 
bureaucrats. Looking at different survey rounds, it can be observed that there is a slight 
increase of bribes paid as a share of production costs from 1.67 percent in the first survey 
round to 1.9 percent in the second survey round. At the same time, the percentage of 
managerial time spent with officials also increases from 4.80 percent to 5.71 percent. 
Naturally, there may be a 6 month inflation effect on bribe payments. However, since bribes 
are measured as percentages of total production costs, which are also affected by price level, 
the effect is controlled for.  further shows that even though the surveys are only six 
months apart, there were still slight adjustments on firm characteristics, such as the number 







                                                 
23 Out of the 470 firms that were interviewed in both rounds, the survey was able to collect the bribery 
information on 383 and 411 firms in the first and second rounds respectively. In the first round, 75 firms who 
admitted paying a very small amount of bribes compared to their total production cost agreed to state their 
answer as 0.000001. Furthermore, three responses reported spending more than 60 percent of their managerial 
time on bureaucracy. As this is not likely to be the case, these firms were identified as outliers and therefore 
removed from the sample. This exclusion does not change the empirical result significantly.  
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Table 2.1 Summary statistics 
 First survey round  Second survey round  Total 
mean std. n  mean std. n  mean std. n 
            
Share of time spent with bureaucracy (percent) 4.80 5.33 379  5.71 6.47 403  5.27 5.96 782 
Bribes (percent) 1.67 4.36 379  1.90 4.26 403  1.79 4.31 782 
Age 17.47 10.66 377  17.73 10.46 389  17.60 10.55 766 
Employees 559 627.24 379  618 805.13 395  589 724 774 
Exporter or importer companies (dummy) 0.78 0.42 379  0.77 0.42 403  0.77 0.42 782 
Government capital share (dummy) 0.02 0.14 379  0.03 0.18 403  0.03 0.16 782 
Multinationals (dummy) 0.45 0.50 377  0.41 0.49 399  0.43 0.50 776 
 
Table 2.2 presents the correlation matrix between variables. It shows that bribes, firm size, 
and export-import companies have a significant positive correlation with the share of 
managerial time spent with officials. As expected, the strongest correlation obtains between 
bribes and time spent with officials. Significant correlation also exists between the 
independent variables. In order to detect whether multicollinearity is an issue, different 
model specifications using different control variables are experimented with in the 
estimation. 
 
Table 2.2 Correlation matrix  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) Share of time spent with bureaucracy (percent) 1.00       
(2) Bribes (percent) 0.37* 1.00      
(3) Age -0.03 -0.01 1.00     
(4) Employees 0.09* -0.02 0.08* 1.00    
(5) Export-import companies (dummy) 0.11* 0.05 -0.05 0.20* 1.00   
(6) Government capital share (dummy) -0.01 -0.04 0.23* 0.06 -0.05 1.00  
(7) Multinationals (dummy) 0.05 0.02 -0.19* 0.18* 0.27* -0.05 1.00 
 Note: * indicates that the correlation is significant at 5 percent confidence level. 
 
Table 2.3 shows the panel estimation results using a random effects model as suggested by 
the Hausman test. When T is small and N is large, the random and fixed effects models 
generate different estimation results. Given that the data in this study have T=2, further tests, 
such as the over-identifying restrictions test, suggested by Arellano (1993) and Wooldridge 
(2002), and the Brusch-Pagan test, are performed. Both tests further indicate that the random 
effects model is preferable.24
                                                 
24 Table B3 in the appendix presents the estimation results using different estimation technique, such as the 
fixed effects and first difference model. Further approach such as pooled estimation, interval regression and 
ordered probit also provide similar results in terms of coefficient sign and significance levels. 
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Table 2.3 Panel random effects: Bribe payments and time spent with officials 
Independent variables Random effect estimation   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Bribes 0.511*** 0.510*** 0.507*** 0.500*** 0.510*** 0.502*** 0.497*** 0.488*** 0.485*** 
 (0.099) (0.043) (0.099) (0.101) (0.100) (0.099) (0.100) (0.105) (0.105) 
Employees  0.001* 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Employees squared  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age   0.017 0.019 0.023 0.011 0.015 0.008 0.003 
   (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.036) (0.037) 
Age squared   -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Dummy: multinationals    0.188   -0.022 -0.103 -0.181 
    (0.434)   (0.444) (0.462) (0.505) 
Dummy: has government share     1.399  1.572 1.413 1.396 
     (1.118)  (1.030) (1.035) (1.049) 
Dummy: if export and/or import      1.134*** 1.203*** 1.265*** 1.252*** 
      (0.367) (0.385) (0.398) (0.402) 
Sector fixed effects No No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Region fixed effects No No No No No No No No Yes 
Number of observations 924 915 906 902 906 906 902 894 894 
Adjusted R2 0.1335 0.1381 0.1382 0.1332 0.1395 0.1444 0.1411 0.1441 0.1457 
          Notes: The dependent variable is the share of managerial time spent with officials to expedite business (in percent). Constant terms are not 
shown; robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
In column 1, variable bribe is included as the only regressor. The result shows that the 
amount of bribes paid is a positive and significant determinant of the amount of managerial 
time spent with the public officials. An increase in the bribes ratio per total production cost 
of one percentage point is associated with an increase in the share of managerial time spent 
with officials for 0.51 percentage points. In the later columns, different specifications are 
experimented with, and the same result is always obtained after controlling for firm-level 
variables. In column 6, when the dummy variable export-import company is included, the 
bribes coefficient declines to 0.502, but remains positive and significant. The coefficient of 
the export-import dummy variable turns out to be positive and significant, which indicates 
that the export-import companies that deal extensively with the customs office explain a 
significant portion of the variation of the managerial time spent officials. In column 9, the 
specification further controls for all firm characteristics, including the sector and region 
fixed effects. The coefficient of bribes declines to 0.485 but remains significant at the 1 
percent level. This implies that a one percentage point increase in the bribes ratio per total 
production cost increases the share of managerial time spent with bureaucracy by about 0.49 
percentage points. As for the control variables, there is a tiny positive and significant effect 
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of the size of the labor force in the company. Even though the sample used in the analysis 
consists of medium-large firms that face a similar set of labor regulations, larger firms 
apparently receive more “supervision” from the public officials. 
 
Table 2.4 2SLS regressions: Bribe payments and time spent with officials 
Independent variables 2SLS Estimation  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
 
Second stage, the dependent variable is the ratio of time spent with officials 
         
Bribes 0.720*** 0.704*** 0.698*** 0.691*** 0.699*** 0.684*** 0.670*** 0.524*** 0.510*** 
 (0.123) (0.123) (0.119) (0.127) (0.118) (0.122) (0.130) (0.201) (0.193) 
Employees  0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Employee squared  -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age   0.071 0.053 0.083 0.057 0.041 0.024 0.040 
   (0.095) (0.099) (0.097) (0.094) (0.100) (0.106) (0.111) 
Age squared   -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Dummy: multinationals    -0.542   -0.790 -0.634 -0.760 
    (0.728)   (0.744) (0.818) (0.898) 
Dummy: has government share     1.146  1.484 0.820 0.891 
     (1.183)  (1.025) (1.228) (1.155) 
Dummy: if export and/or import      1.260** 1.601** 1.889*** 1.701** 
      (0.640) (0.688) (0.731) (0.745) 
          
 
First stage, the dependent variable is bribes  
         
Bribes 0.367*** t-1  0.366*** 0.364*** 0.347*** 0.363*** 0.362*** 0.343*** 0.323** 0.313** 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.094) (0.090) (0.094) (0.095) (0.090) (0.129) (0.121) 
Sector fixed effects No No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Region fixed effects No No No No No No No No Yes 
          
Number of observations 340 332 326 324 326 326 324 319 319 
Adjusted R2 0.215 0.224 0.225 0.213 0.223 0.227 0.215 0.192 0.188 
Pagan Hall (p-value) 0.67 0.65 0.48 0.61 0.60 0.37 0.59 0.73 0.60 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman (p-value) 0.61 0.62 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.38 0.38 0.44 
F-stat first stage 14.95 14.74 14.87 14.88 14.88 14.61 14.58 6.28 6.71 
 
Notes: IV estimates are reported. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses, constant terms not shown. F-stat first 
stage is the joint probability of an F-test for the first stage regressions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
In order to sort out the potential reverse causality between bribes and the time spent with an 
official, the bribes paid in the previous round (round 1) is used to instrument the current 
bribes (round 2). Repeating the key regression used in Table 2.3, Table 2.4 shows that the 
bribes coefficient remains positive and significant with a higher magnitude.25
                                                 
25 It should be noted that the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test consistently gives p-value above 0.1, which indicates 
that it fails to reject the null hypothesis that the variable bribe is exogenous. This means that the OLS technique 
 Controlling for 
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firm characteristics as well as sector and region fixed effects (column 9), the result obtains a 
slope coefficient of 0.51, which is significant at the 1 percent level. The reported first stage 
F-statistics for the specifications without fixed effects indicates that the quality of the 
instrumental variable is quite good. However, once the specification controls for the sector 
and region fixed effects, the F-statistics decline to below 10, raising a small concern 
regarding the strength of the instrument. Nevertheless, as the coefficient of the main variable 
bribes remains positive and significant, it can be argued that the 2SLS results are a little bit 
problematic due to the weak instrument issue, but the results reinforce the basic findings of 
random effects estimation.26
The study subsequently tests the possibility of non-linear relationships between the key 
elements of the “grease the wheels” hypothesis. In 
 
Table 2.5, the squared value of variable 
bribes is included in the specification. The results show that there is a non-linear relationship 
between bribes payments and time spent with officials. In columns 1 to 4, the results of 
random effects are reported. Comparing the full model in column 4 and column 9 in table 4, 
the results show that the magnitude of the bribe’s coefficient increases to 0.75 while the 
squared term coefficient is -0.01, both significant at the 1 percent level. This suggests that 
the share of managerial time spent with official increases with the size of the bribes at a 
decreasing rate until it reaches a turning point at 34.14 percentage points (still in the 
sample). Beyond this value, higher bribes may reduce the time spent with officials. The 
estimation of the non-linear specification using the fixed effects model also confirms this 
finding, even though the effect seems to fade away when the model controls for firm 
characteristics and sector fixed effects (column 7).27
  
 
                                                                                                                                                      
gives a more consistent estimation. Nevertheless, given the potential reverse causality between variable bribe 
and the dependent variable, the 2SLS estimation results are still relevant (full results are shown in Table B4). 
26 It is acknowledged that these results ultimately confirm the positive relationship between bribe payments and 
the amount of time spent with officials, which supposed to survive from the endogeneity issues. However, one 
could certainly argue that using lagged bribes may not be sufficient, as it may be the case that lagged bribes are 
affected by the same unobserved factors as the present bribes. 
27 The non-linear effect is also not found in the 2SLS results (Appendix 4).  
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Table 2.5 Non-linear relationship between the amount of bribes paid and the time spent with 
officials. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 RE RE RE RE FE FE FE 
        
Bribes  0.784*** 0.759*** 0.750*** 0.751*** 0.706*** 0.660*** 0.277 
 (0.119) (0.123) (0.121) (0.121) (0.202) (0.210) (0.277) 
Bribes squared -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011** -0.010* 0.011 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.014) 
Employees  0.000 0.001 0.001  0.008*** 0.010*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.003) (0.004) 
Employees squared  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Age  0.015 0.008 0.003  -0.055 -0.083 
  (0.034) (0.036) (0.038)  (0.095) (0.105) 
Age squared  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Dummy: multinationals  0.024 -0.059 -0.119  0.243 0.084 
  (0.445) (0.461) (0.505)  (1.284) (1.239) 
Dummy: has government share  1.702* 1.557 1.543  -0.336 -0.667 
  (0.993) (1.003) (1.014)  (2.185) (2.083) 
Dummy: if export and/or import  1.173*** 1.234*** 1.219***  0.925 1.040 




Sector fixed effects no no yes yes no no Yes 
Region fixed effects no no no yes no no no 
Number of Obs. 924 902 894 894 924 902 894 
Adjusted R2 0.146 0.153 0.153 0.155 0.062 0.070 0.079 
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of managerial time spent with officials to deal with bureaucracy. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, constant terms are not shown. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
2.5.1 Competitive bribery with asymmetric information 
In Table 2.6, the results of the competitive bribery with an asymmetric information 
framework are presented. In this framework, I examine whether officials will grant reduced 
bureaucracy to those who pay larger bribes than the firm-specific average bribe. In order to 
test this, the bribe variable is estimated using firm characteristics, as well as sector and 
regional fixed effects. The predicted residuals (𝜀?̂?𝑡) of this estimation represent the difference 
between the bribes paid and the average bribe. The obtained 𝜀?̂?𝑡  is subsequently included as 
a regressor to estimate the time spent with officials, replacing the bribe variable. Column 2 
shows that the coefficient ε�it  is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Further controlling for firm characteristics as well as fixed effects, the magnitude and 
significances of the coefficient ε�it do not change considerably. In column 9, the coefficient 
ε�it  is 0.485, which indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in the difference between the 
actual and predicted bribe is associated with an increase in the share of managerial time 
 60 
spent with officials of about 0.49 percentage points. This finding is again inconsistent with 
the “grease the wheels” hypothesis. Firms that pay larger bribes are the ones discriminated 
against by public officials, who cause them to waste more time in dealing with bureaucracy. 
It is true that by categorizing firms based on the value of ε�it into quartiles (Q1, Q2, Q3 and 
Q4
A potential problem with this empirical strategy stems from the potential endogeneity issue. 
For instance, there is a possibility that the amount of bribes paid in the first period influences 
the effectiveness of the public officials (time spent with the officials), which then affects 
some of the firm-level variables in the second period. To address this concern, a separate 
regression in each survey period is performed. First, the variable Bribes is estimated using 
firm characteristics on the basis of the first round sub-samples (column 12). Second, the 
predicted firm-specific residual obtained from the first step is then included as a regressor to 
estimate the time spent with officials using the second round sub-samples (column 13). In 
this way, the predicted residual  𝜀?̂?𝑡−1  is predetermined and therefore may resolve the 
endogeneity issue. 
), column 10 shows that firms in the highest quartiles spent significantly more time with 
officials. Column 11 shows the estimation results from the fixed effects model and seconds 
the findings.  
Columns 12 to 14 show the results of the OLS estimation of the cross-sectional model. 
Again, column 13 confirms the clear positive relationship between the predicted residuals 
and the time spent with officials but smaller in size. Focusing on the quartiles dummy 
variables, the results also confirm the previous findings with even more significant results. 
Column 14 shows that the size of the quartile’s coefficient increases with each quartile 
category. The larger the bribe a firm pays compared to its predicted bribes, the more time the 
firm spends with officials. One possible explanation of this finding is that greedy officials 
may target the “weak” firms that are less reluctant to pay high bribes. Thus, officials may 
deliberately impose administrative delays. 
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Table 2.6 Competitive bribery with asymmetric information 
Dependent variable: 



































FE OLS OLS OLS 
               
Employees -0.000 0.001* 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.009*** -0.000 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Employees squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age -0.028  0.007 0.011 0.009 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.011 -0.034 -0.179* -0.022 -0.016 -0.066 
 (0.036)  (0.032) (0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.035) (0.037) (0.038) (0.108) (0.044) (0.129) (0.127) 
Age squared 0.000  -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Dummy: multinationals 0.009   0.211   -0.062 -0.109 -0.177 -0.019 0.472 0.121 -0.201 -0.095 
 (0.415)   (0.441)   (0.450) (0.462) (0.505) (0.508) (1.164) (0.463) (0.865) (0.868) 
Dummy: has government share -1.125**    0.676  0.920 0.866 0.851 -0.265 -1.127 -0.168 2.179** 2.008** 
 (0.481)    (1.123)  (1.009) (1.023) (1.046) (1.106) (2.018) (0.523) (1.014) (1.019) 
Dummy: if export and/or import 0.515*     1.475*** 1.512*** 1.529*** 1.502*** 1.738*** 1.805** -0.444 0.079 0.009 
 (0.298)     (0.371) (0.387) (0.399) (0.401) (0.436) (0.853) (1.511) (2.302) (2.300) 
𝜀𝑡�   0.483*** 0.484*** 0.484*** 0.484*** 0.485*** 0.486*** 0.486*** 0.485***    0.249**   (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.104) (0.105)    (0.109)  
𝑄2          -0.719 -0.222   2.234* 
         (0.519) (1.069)   (1.206) 
𝑄3          0.472 0.036   2.244* 
         (0.615) (1.299)   (1.192) 
𝑄4          3.616*** 2.511**   3.080*** 
         (0.708) (1.154)   (1.147) 
Sector fixed effects Yes No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed effects Yes No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 894 472 340 340 
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.120 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.131 0.132 0.141 0.146 0.107 0.034 0.009 0.052 0.053 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Estimation results in column 12 use the sub-samples from the first survey round, while column 13 use the second survey round.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This paper investigates the “grease the wheels” hypothesis of corruption by examining the 
effect of illegal bribe payments on the effectiveness of public service delivery. Analyzing 
information from 470 firms in Indonesia, this study finds results inconsistent with the 
“grease the wheels” hypothesis, though a non-linear relationship is found. Sorting out the 
reverse causality problem, this study still finds no evidence that supports the hypothesis.  
The study further examines the context of the competitive bribery under imperfect 
information, which is relevant for the case of Indonesia, a country with a long history of 
corruption. This paper argues that when there is asymmetric information, a corrupt official 
may consider the firm’s type in granting a shorter bureaucracy waiting time. The 
econometric analysis suggests that firms that pay larger bribes compared to the average bribe 
face further bureaucratic delays.  
Profit maximizing firms will not pay bribes if they are higher than they can afford. The 
“weak” firms might do so for several reasons. It could be that firms are frustrated and want 
to accelerate slow services; or that firms are hiding illegal activities and need to collude with 
public officials; or that firms that pay bribes also need to spend time simultaneously with 
officials to smooth business activities. The extent to which  these reasons are operative has 
not been investigated in this study, but these questions suggest a great potential for future 
research to provide a better understanding of the motivations of firms in terms of bribery 
transactions, as well as in identifying the official’s selection properties in granting less or 
more bureaucracy’s burden.  
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3 Women in power: Do women politicians 





This paper examines whether higher representation of women in a locally elected group of 
community representatives is likely to shape policy outcomes. The median voter theorem 
predicts that in a perfect indirect democracy, the platforms of elected representatives 
represent the preferences of the median voter, and therefore the politician’s identity would 
not necessarily matter. This paper empirically tests the theory by using ex-ante data on the 
preferences of both households and elected representatives toward different poverty 
programs offered by a nationwide community-driven development project in Indonesia, the 
Urban Poverty Project 2. We find that in most cases, the preferences of the median voter do 
not matter for policy outcomes, but in some cases they do. We show that the proportion of 
the project budget allocated to education, health and irrigation programs is higher in 
communities where the median voter is concerned about this issue. Furthermore, we find 
that the female proportion of representatives is irrelevant for policy outcomes, but does 
facilitate the preferences of the median voter and particularly the preferences of female 
voters who request improvements in public sanitation. 
 
  
                                                 
28 This paper is based on joint work with Stephan Klasen. 
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3.1 Introduction 
There is a substantial literature demonstrating that women have different political interests 
from men, as expressed in their voting and leadership behavior. These differences can be 
derived from the traditional intra-household division of tasks, which limits women's 
participation in the job market, and consequently makes them more vulnerable to poverty 
following divorce or the death of a partner. Empirically, Edlund and Pande (2002) show a 
strong positive relationship between state divorce prevalence and women's support for the 
Democratic Party, which promotes transfer and income redistribution policies. A similar 
result is obtained by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), who show that women are generally 
supportive of redistributive policies, as they are less likely to pay taxes and more likely to 
receive benefits. 
Even though the most of evidence indicates that women have different preferences 
concerning political outcomes (e.g. Lott and Kenny, 1999; Svaleryd, 2009), women are still 
underrepresented in politics, particularly in developing countries. Social norms that dictate 
that women should follow men, religious beliefs that require that society not be led by 
women, or internalized stereotypes have caused women to be marginalized from political 
positions, which restrains them from voicing their own choices. Indeed, granting more 
political access to women may increase women’s ability to make choices through more 
inclusive and representative institutions (World Bank, 2012). However, little is known about 
whether female representation will lead to policy outcomes that are more responsive to 
women’s needs. 
The median voter theorem proposed by Downs (1957) states that in a perfect democracy, the 
elected politician is the one whose platform represents the preferences of the median voter. 
Under this model, a politician’s identity is irrelevant to shaping political outcomes, since 
only the preferences of the median voter matter. Nevertheless, an elected politician can only 
enact the policy commitment once she is in office. It remains uncertain whether the 
politician will credibly commit to the median voter’s preferences if doing so would oppose 
the politician's own interests. Thus, the median voter theory has been criticized for its rather 
restrictive policy commitment. In an alternative economic model of representative 
democracy (the citizen candidate model), Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and 
Slivinski (1996) relax the assumption of complete policy commitment, by allowing for the 
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role of a politician’s character as an important factor in policy outcomes. Similarly, Levitt 
(1996) examines whether senators' identities shape the policies that they support and shows 
that a senator’s own ideology becomes the most important factor of roll-call voting patterns, 
while voter preferences reflect only one quarter weight in the politician’s utility function. 
Several studies provide evidence about the effect of a politician’s gender on policy 
outcomes. In the context of the women reservation policy in India’s village council, 
Chattopadhyay  and Duflo (2004) found that allocating leadership positions exclusively to 
women leads to more resource allocation for programs that matter more to women. 
However, Sathe et al. (2013) show that the impact of this policy takes time to develop, as 
women need first to build up experience, in order to ensure service availability for women. 
In a different context, Rehavi (2007) finds that an increase in the number of women in US 
state legislatures caused significant rise in health spending, while in the context of Swedish 
local councils, it increases childcare and education spending relative to elderly care 
(Svaleryd, 2009). To sum up, most of the available empirical studies only focus on the roles 
of females as politicians or females as voters, and their impacts on policy outcomes.  
There are only a few studies that focus on the relevance of the voter’s gender differences in 
preferences, and relate this to differences in preferences of male and female politicians, and 
how these factors simultaneously influence policy outcomes.29
                                                 
29 Funk and Gathmann (2006) examine the intensive democracy system in Switzerland, where all citizens can 
directly decide on a broad range of policies in referenda and initiatives. They use the voting decisions data to 
capture voter preferences, analyze the gender gap in the preferences of voters toward a range of policies, and 
relate this to the effect of women as policy makers on the composition of public spending. Chattopadhyay and 
Duflo (2004) use the number of formal requests and complaints brought to the Pradhan as a proxy for 
community preferences. They use this information to analyze whether women policy makers are more 
responsive to issues brought forward by women in these communities. 
 Analyzing the gender gap in 
differences is important, because if female politicians' preferences were the same as those of 
male politicians, a reservation policy for women would not be necessary. Duflo (2004) 
illustrates the case where different gender preferences may not translate into different 
political views: “…a household where members could promise to each other that they would 
vote in a certain way ought to cast their votes in such a way as to maximize the expected 
value of the bundle of policies chosen for the household as a whole. A member who benefits 
more from the policy can supply compensation for the other's vote. In this world, there 
would be no difference in the expressed policy preferences of (married) women and men.” 
Acknowledging this issue, a comprehensive analysis of gender differences in the preferences 
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of both voters and politicians may improve our understanding of the effectiveness of 
women-reservation policies in representative democracies. 
This study contributes to the literature by empirically considering the link between female 
representation and female preferences, and its impact on policy outcomes, in the context of 
the median voter theorem. In this paper, we first explore whether median voter preferences 
matter for allocating resources. Second, we investigate whether higher female 
representatives results in policy outcomes that are more responsive to women's needs. Using 
data from 154 communities in Indonesia, we analyze the ex-ante preferences of both voters 
and elected representatives toward eight programs offered by a nationwide community-
driven development program in Indonesia, the Urban Poverty Project 2 (UPP2). To the best 
of our knowledge, our study is the first to attempt to test the Downsian model under 
representative democracy using ex-ante preference data for both voters and policy makers.  
Our empirical analyses find that in most cases, the median voter’s preferences do not matter 
to policy outcomes, but in some cases they do. We show that the portion of the UPP2 budget 
that goes to education, health and irrigation programs is higher in communities where the 
median voter raises the issue in relation to this particular program. Furthermore, we find that 
the proportion of local representatives who are female is not the main driver of changes in 
the UPP2 budget composition. However, an increased movement of women into local 
representative office does facilitate the preferences of the median voter, and particularly the 
preferences of female voters who request more attention to public sanitation. One possible 
reason for the small effect of female representatives is that the preferences of female and 
male representatives are similar, and that they differ only on issues related to public 
sanitation, but not more generally. Our results suggest that although median voter 
preferences matter to policy outcomes, the gender of the politician is the most important 
determinant of resource allocation, specifically on programs that matter most for women. 
Thus, our study casts doubt on the empirical relevance of the median voter theorem in this 
respect. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section will discuss the mechanism of 
UPP2. Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy used to examine the effect of the median 
voter and female representatives on policy outcomes. Section 4 describes the data and 
presents some descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the central results of this study. 
Section 6 concludes the study. 
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3.2 The selection of representatives and anti-poverty 
programs in UPP2 
The Urban Poverty Project 2 (UPP2) is an Indonesian nationwide poverty alleviation 
program that was implemented between 2004 and 2007, aiming to minimize the impact of 
the Asian financial crisis on urban poverty. Expanding the coverage of its precursor, UPP2 
allocated US$127 million to around 2,000 urban kelurahans or “urban village” in 13 
provinces, so that each kelurahan had access to a one-time grant allocation of up to around 
US$55,000, depending on the size of the population.30
In every kelurahan, there is one BKM consisting of 9 to 14 board members who are 
delegated the authority to manage UPP2 resources. Furthermore, to ensure female 
representation in the BKM, UPP2 recommends that at least one-third of BKM members be 
women. However, the strategy seems not to have been fully successful, since only 16.34 
percent of the elected board members were women, far less than the 49 percent of female 
voters, although still higher than women’s representation in the national parliament in 2004 
(around 11.3 percent). 
 UPP2 adopts the community-driven 
development approach by promoting community participation, defining poverty according to 
community criteria, and choosing poverty alleviation programs through their mandated 
representatives in the community institution fostered by UPP2, called the BKM (Badan 
Keswadayaan Masyarakat or board of community trustees).  
Given the central importance of the BKM, the process of electing members was organized in 
a participatory manner. At the initial stage of project implementation, communities were 
asked to think about the qualities that a leader should have and name a person in their 
neighborhood that possessed such qualities to be nominated as a BKM member. The names 
were then submitted to the kelurahan meeting at which communities subsequently voted 
through a secret ballot. Finally, the winners of the election serve as unpaid BKM members 
who are delegated the authority to allocate UPP2 resources. 
                                                 
30 Indonesia is divided into 33 provinces, which in turn are composed of districts. Each district is further broken 
down into sub-districts. Below the sub-district level, there are villages and urban villages called kelurahan. 
Typically, a kelurahan is divided non-administratively into several neighborhoods (RW) that consists of 
several wards (RT). Each ward manages a certain number of households. 
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To ensure that communities expressed their preferences regarding the types of programs that 
should be implemented, local residents could participate in a community discussion, led by 
BKM members, to form a Community Development Plan (CDP) containing poverty 
reduction strategies for the next three years. Residents could also submit their own project 
proposals to BKM members if the CDP did not cover their preferences. Afterwards, project 
selection and funding allocation were decided by BKM members through an internal 
decision-making process. 
Table 3.1 Classification of UPP2 programs 
Sector Program type Project description 
Infrastructure 
1. Roads/bridges New construction or rehabilitation of roads/bridges. 
2. House improvement Rehabilitation of residential houses of the vulnerable poor. 
3. Public sanitation Drainage, public toilets, non-permanent garbage facilities. 
4. Water, public 
lighting 
Construction or rehabilitation of community’s clean water, water 
tanks, public lighting, etc. 
5. Education, health 
and irrigation 
facilities 
Infrastructure related projects, mostly on education, health and 
irrigation facilities. 
   
Social 
6. Welfare programs 
Grant assistance to specific individuals identified as being most 
needy or vulnerable, including support for orphans, the elderly, and 
the poor, in the form of scholarships, health care, etc. 
7. Trainings 
Support for training or informal education to improve skills among 
the poor. 
   
Economic 8. Microfinance 
Small scale manufacturing support (i.e. small scale shoe factory, 
clothing, handbags, pottery, and support for petty trade such as 
selling cooked/fresh food, services such as electronics repair, 
tailoring, etc.) 
   
Source: The MIS glossary. 
 
According to the UPP2 Monitoring Information System (MIS), the projects accomplished  
are sorted into 3 sectors, namely infrastructure, social, and economic sectors, which further 
break down into 11 programs, with each program consisting of several activities. For 
simplification, we re-classified the program types into eight programs, as described in Table 
3.1.31
                                                 
31In the MIS data, the UPP2 program’s disbursement is classified into: (1) roads/bridges, (2) housing, (3) 
sanitation, (4) water and public lighting, (5) infrastructure others (education, health and irrigation facilities), (6) 
training, (7) poverty grants, (8) social others, (9) household industry (10) retail and (11) economic others. We 
have re-classified social others into poverty grants, and summed the household industry, retail, and economic 
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3.3 Empirical strategy 
3.3.1 The median voter’s preferences 
In the classic median voter model, politicians implement the median voter’s preferred policy, 
while the politician’s preferences and identity are irrelevant. To test that, we estimate the 
following cross section model: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑗
𝑝 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝑚𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗
𝑝 + 𝛼3𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 (3.1) 
   
Ypij
Table 3.1
 are the outcome variables that represent the proportion of the UPP2 budget allocated to 
each program p in kelurahan i, district j. Superscript p stands for the eight programs as 
described in , namely: 1. roads/bridges; 2. house improvement; 3. public sanitation; 
4. water and public lighting; 5. education, health, and irrigation facilities; 6. training; 7. 
welfare programs; and 8. microfinance. We consider the outcome variables Ypij 
The effect of median voter preferences on the dependent variables is represented by a 
dummy variable 𝑚𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗
𝑝, which takes the value of 1 if the preference of the median voter 
matches with the particular program type of the dependent variable. For example, in 
estimating the share of the budget allocated to road/bridge programs (𝑌𝑖𝑗
𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑/𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑔𝑒), the 
dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the median voter in kelurahan i raised this issue in 
their community. The median voter herself is selected based on the per capita consumption 
of adult individuals in the community. 
to be jointly 
determined, as they are linked by a budget constraint. Nevertheless, since the control 
variables are the same in all equations, estimating equation by equation using OLS 
estimation would produce coefficients and standard errors numerically identical to a joint 
estimation of the system equations. Thus, in this study, the proportion of the UPP2 budget 
allocated to each program p is estimated equation by equation using OLS. 
Furthermore, Xij 
                                                                                                                                                      
others into microfinance programs, since most economic projects are financed under the revolving fund 
scheme. 
is a vector of controls for log population, log average consumption, and the 
pre-existing public goods in the kelurahan, such as access to drinkable water based on the 
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MDG (Millennium Development Goals) definition, access to a latrine, the number of 
financial institutions used to save and borrow, and the distance to the nearest central bus 
station (in minutes). Finally, district fixed effects μj  
 
are included. 
3.3.2 The role of women representatives 
One of the implications of the median voter theorem is that the politician’s identity will not 
matter to policy outcomes. In order to test this, we investigate the particular issue of whether 
higher female representation in BKM is associated with higher budget allocation to 
programs that are more responsive to women’s needs. In the following equation, we include 
the variable rfemale, which represents the share of the number of female representatives in 
the BKM: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑗
𝑝 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝑚𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗
𝑝 + 𝛼3𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼4𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 (3.2) 
 
The classic median voter model predicts that the effects of rfemale will be 0, yet, if the 
gender of the politician matter, 𝛼3≠0 that such effects might be reflected in changes in the 
composition of UPP2 expenditures.  
Furthermore, we next examine whether female representatives are more responsive to the 
relative preferences of voters of their own gender. Following Chattopadhyay and Duflo 








�           p = (1, 2, 3, ..., 8)      (3.3) 
 
Let 𝐷𝑠𝑖
𝑝  as the relative strength of women’s preferences toward specific program p in 
kelurahan i. The subscript s stands for the sample used (voter or BKM representative 
preferences), w stands for women, and m for men. Therefore 𝑛𝑤𝑠𝑖
𝑝   is how many times the 
particular program p is mentioned by women, while 𝑁𝑤𝑠𝑖 is the total issues related to the 




 is the share of female preferences 




𝑝 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝑚𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗
𝑝 + 𝛼3𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼4𝐷𝑠𝑖
𝑝 + 𝛼5(𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝐷𝑠𝑖
𝑝)+𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
 Adding 𝐷𝑠𝑖
𝑝  to the equation as a single and an interaction term, our empirical 
specification now reads: 
(3.4) 
 
Estimating equation (3.4), we are particularly interested in examining the interaction term 
between the gender gap in preferences and the share of female representation in the BKM, so 
that if α5≠0, this can be interpreted that female representatives in BKM are responsive to the 
relative strength of female preferences.33
To link these individual preferences into policy outcomes, our empirical strategy makes a 
number of assumptions. First, we assume that under perfect democracy, the project budget 
should be allocated proportionally to how often a preference (problem) also mentioned by 
residents. Second, we assume that the preferences of the residents were then communicated 





We combine two unique data sets from the World Bank, namely the UPP2 impact evaluation 
survey (IES) and the UPP2 monitoring information system (MIS). The IES is a built in 
quasi-experimental survey that was designed to evaluate the impact of UPP2. The baseline 
survey was conducted around February-March 2004 followed by the midterm survey that 
was only performed in the treatment area, carried out in 2005 for locations within Java and 
in March 2006 for the outer islands. The survey was conducted after the formation of BKM 
institution, but before the funding disbursement.  
                                                 
32Since the UPP2 impact evaluation survey only interviewed 3 out of 9 to 14 BKM members in every 
community, there are cases where none of the BKM members' preferences match  any of the eight UPP2 





 or  𝑛𝑚𝑠𝑖
𝑝
𝑁𝑚𝑠𝑖




 and/or  𝑛𝑚𝑠𝑖
𝑝
𝑁𝑚𝑠𝑖
 is set 
equal to 0 in these cases. We then create an indicator variable for kelurahans where these changes applied.  
33 Note that the variable 𝐷𝑠𝑖
𝑝 is calculated for both BKM members and voters. In the regression, we include these 
as different variables. 
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For the purposes of this study, we primarily use the information from the midterm survey 
that captures the preferences of both BKM members and household samples in the same 
time frame. Indeed, using the midterm data may be biased, since it could be distorted by 
community expectations regarding UPP2. However, using baseline data would not capture 
the preferences of BKM members or the new problems that may have arisen after the survey. 
On top of that, we do not use the baseline survey since there is a chance that some pressing 
problems mentioned in the baseline survey might already have been resolved.  
The second data source used in this study is the MIS data, which reports on the project’s 
deliverables in
Table 3.2
 every community. It provides information on the number of projects 
accomplished in every kelurahan as well as on project costs, broken down to program type 
( ). 
Table 3.2 Average UPP2 projects received by communities, by program type 
Program 
                  Cost of projects           Number of projects 
     Mean Std. Dev. Min Max   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  
            Roads/bridges 120.2 62.4 0 346.7  22.4 12.3 0 58 
Housing 21.7 29.6 0 223.2   4.4 5.9 0 34  
Public sanitation 48.9 33.7 0 144.6   11.3 8.2 0 40  
Water and public lighting 22.9 25.0 0 142.8   5.2 5.3 0 34  
Health, education and irrigation facility 1.5 4.4 0 37.0   0.4 0.9 0 5  
Welfare programs 52.9 22.7 13.9 160.8   9.6 6.8 3 44  
Training 11.0 10.8 0 53.5   2.3 2.4 0 13  
Microfinance 196.6 79.9 52.4 637.6   48.8 22.2 12 177  
 Notes: The calculation is based on MIS data using 154 kelurahan. Costs of the projects are in millions rupiah. 
 
Since UPP2 promotes active community participation in deciding on poverty alleviation 
strategies, it is expected that project resource allocation should represent the preferences of 
the communities. In the survey, IES randomly selected 32 households in every kelurahan to 
be interviewed, where in each household two representative adults (one female and one 
male) were asked to identify the three most urgent problems that should be improved in their 
community. In the questionnaire, the particular question was addressed: “Now, we are going 
to make inquiries concerning problems or issues that need to be improved in your kelurahan 
in the last one year. Name three primary issues that need problem solving or improvement in 
your kelurahan/village”. Three BKM members (one coordinator, one female, and one male) 
in every community were asked a similar question. However, although the questionnaire 
provides the codes for possible answers, it still fails to capture many issues, where this 
resulted in the code “others” being the most frequently chosen one (Pradhan et al., 2010). 
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To overcome this problem, we re-classified the three open-ended responses of more than 
eight thousand individuals into 17 general issues, eight of which were covered by UPP2. For 
purposes of this study, the three preferences given by each respondent are classified by 
applying transitivity axioms; that is, by employing only the first-mentioned preference that 
matches with one of the eight programs covered by UPP2.34
Table 3.3
  
 shows the detailed classification of the respondents’ stated preferences. We 
differentiate between public goods provided by the central government and those covered by 
UPP2. For example, improvement of the quantity and quality of medical doctors falls under 
the domain of the central government, thus complaints related to this issue are classified 
under “public facilities in general”. On the other hand, complaints about bad health facilities 
which fall under the coverage of the UPP2 programs are classified into “education, health 
and irrigation facility”.  
 
  
                                                 
34 The following rule is used: (1) if the 1st preference matches one of the UPP2 programs, then this preference 
is used. (2) If the 1st preference does not match one of the UPP2 programs, then it is replaced with the 2nd 
preference, if the 2nd rank preference matches a UPP2 program, and so on. (3) If none of the three preferences 
matches the UPP2 programs, then it is classified under one of the non-UPP2 issues. (4) If none of the responses 
matches the UPP2 programs or the non-UPP2 issues, then it is treated as a missing value. 
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Table 3.3 Classification of open-ended preferences 
Issues covered by UPP2 Programs Issues not covered by UPP2 Programs 
Road/bridge improvement Agricultural issues 
  
Others 
quality of access to the village   agricultural issues Others - public facilities provided by gov. 
  quality of roads within the village, talud  Education issues public facilities in general 
  House improvement low education  health facility, poor quality of doctor 
  house improvement  Environmental issues school facility, poor quality of teacher 
  Public sanitation environmental issues  traditional market facilities 
  drainage waterways facilities   pollution  bus station facilities 
  sanitation  Health issues cemetery facilities 
  waste facilities   low quality of health  telecommunication facilities 
  tanggul   environmental health  sport facilities 
  Water and public lighting epidemic disease  lack of worship facilities 
  clean water/drinkable water   lack of community hygiene  parking facilities 
  public lighting  Women’s issues village office 
  Education, health and irrigation facilities malnutrition  transportation service 
  health facilities   posyandu improvement  traffic 
  health facility, poor quality of building   women issues  electricity 
  irrigation facilities Others - economy in general Poor welfare program 
  school facilities, poor quality of school building   poor welfare program  economy in general 
Poverty  Security issues welfare 
  poverty   security issues  low-wage/income 
  high food price   youth crime  inflation 
  high health fees Others - service quality from local gov. Social issues 
  high school fees   lack of social bonds  low service quality from gov. officer 
  poverty, elderly   community cooperation  corruption 
  poverty, grants   community organization  too many donations requested 
  poverty, orphan   empowerment  transparency 
  scholarships   participation Others - land and natural disaster 
  Training youth issues  natural disaster 
  dropping out of school   social issues  land 
  lack of human resources Others - individual morale Unemployment 
  training   unemployment  individual awareness 
  Microfinance   religion 
  koperasi    Others - others 
  lack of business capital     others, missing values, don’t know 
  lack of credit facilities     no issues, not clear 
  small business support      
       
Notes: *Posyandu is a monthly clinic for children and pregnant women, providing vaccinations and nutritional supplements. Talud is the 
paving on the roadside to prevent landslides. Tanggul is the embankment built to prevent flooding during the rainy season. Koperasi is a 
cooperative association, usually used for credit unions 
 
Figure 3.1 presents the preferences of the median voter, who is identified using per capita 
consumption, regarding the eight programs offered by UPP2. Ideally, there should be 154 
median voter’s preferences in our sample, but since every kelurahan interviewed two adults 
(with the same per capita consumption) in 32 households, it can be the case that there is 
more than one median voter in a kelurahan. Out of 411 median voters identified in our 
sample, 176 of them provide suggestions that are not covered by UPP2.  Figure 3.1 shows 
that about one-third of the median voters prefer roads/bridges improvement, followed by 
preferences for public sanitation and welfare programs.  
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Figure 3.1 Frequency of median voter preferences, by sex 
 
       Note: The calculation is based on UPP2 impact evaluation survey and UPP2-MIS data. 
 
We also analyze the preferences stated by voters and BKM members, grouped by gender. On 
average, the share of female BKM members in every kelurahan is 19 percent of the total, 
with the lowest share at 0 percent (for 23 BKM) and the highest share at around 72 percent. 
Table 3.4 shows the fraction of the issues mentioned by both households and BKM members 
broken down by gender. The table shows that the majority (more than 60 percent) of the 
issues mentioned by respondents correspond to the UPP2 programs.35
 
 Focusing on the issues 
related to UPP2, road/bridge and public sanitation improvement are the issues that were by 
far the most frequently mentioned by female voters. Although male voters also promoted the 
same priorities, a higher proportion of men appear to prefer roads/bridges improvement. The 
chi-square test for whether the distributions of male and female stated preferences are the 
same rejects the hypothesis (p-value=0.001), meaning that female and male voters indeed 
have different preferences.  
  
                                                 
35 For gender’s preferences consistency check, it is interesting to see that “women’s issues” is significant. That 
is, most women in general indeed significantly mentioned more issues that particularly very close related with 
women.  
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Table 3.4 Issues raised by women and men, voters and BKM members 
 
              Household                      BKM 
  Women Men Diff. Women Men Diff. 
           
Poverty programs – UPP2   72.2 71.2 1.0  77.1 68.6 8.5 * 
Agricultural issues   0.4 0.7 -0.3   0.0 0.0 0.0   
Education issues   0.5 0.2 0.3 * 1.7 0.9 0.8   
Environment and pollution   0.4 0.7 -0.2   0.9 0.9 -0.1   
Health issues   2.9 2.1 0.8 ** 1.7 2.1 -0.4   
Women’s issues   0.9 0.1 0.8 *** 0.9 0.0 0.9 * 
Poor welfare program   3.9 3.5 0.5   1.7 6.3 -4.7 ** 
Security issues   2.5 2.5 0.0   2.5 1.8 0.7   
Social issues   2.5 2.6 0.0   1.7 3.3 -1.6   
Unemployment   4.9 4.3 0.6   5.9 4.8 1.1   
Others   8.9 12.3 -3.4 *** 5.9 11.2 -5.3   
Total   100 100    100 100   
N   2,995  3,208  118  331  
chi-square    52.34    11.61   
p-value    0.000    0.236   
            Breakdown of UPP2 programs          
Roads/bridges   30.8 34.7 -3.9 *** 16.5 18.1 -1.6   
House improvement   2.8 2.6 0.2   4.4 1.8 2.6   
Public sanitation   23.6 24.8 -1.2   29.7 18.9 10.7 ** 
Water and public lighting   9.9 9.4 0.5   4.4 9.3 -4.9   
Education, health, irrigation facility   2.0 2.5 -0.5   2.2 3.1 -0.9   
Welfare programs   20.1 15.7 4.3 *** 24.2 26.4 -2.3   
Training   1.9 2.7 -0.8 * 5.5 7.5 -2.0   
Microfinance   8.9 7.5 1.4 * 13.2 15.0 -1.8   
Total   100 100   100 100   
N   2,163  2,284  91  227   
chi-square    25.06    8.05   
p-value    0.001    0.328    
Note:s *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 show significances for t-tests on the equality of means. Each cell lists the number of times an issue 
was mentioned, divided by the total number of issues in each panel. Chi-square values placed across two columns test the hypothesis that 
issues come from the same distribution in the two columns. 
 
In contrast, the preferences of female and male BKM members in terms of UPP2 programs 
seem to be similar (p-value=0.328). Both groups appear to agree on the major importance of 
welfare programs for the poor. They tend to be different only in terms of public sanitation, as 
almost 30 percent of women BKM members list public sanitation as their top priority, while 
only 18.9 percent of male BKM members agree. If we allowed political identity to matter, 
we would expect that a higher share of women represented in the BKM would lead to 
provision of more public sanitation by UPP2, since this is the only issue on which women 




Table 3.5 Descriptive statistics for general population and BKM members, by gender 
Variables 
 (1)  (2)  
 BKM Members           General Population  
 Women Men   Women Men   
Age  39.06 43.70 ***  41.30 45.46 ***  
Married  0.80 0.94 ***  0.90 0.92 ***  
Muslim  0.91 0.91   0.91 0.90   
Household size  4.49 4.79   4.59 4.61   
           Education         
Years of schooling  12.81 13.05 **  8.52 9.28 ***  
Primary education  0.01 0.02 **  0.41 0.35 ***  
Secondary education  0.51 0.40 **  0.20 0.18 ***  
Tertiary education  0.48 0.58 **  0.25 0.32 ***  
           Economic         
Employed  0.65 0.84 ***  0.38 0.87 ***  
Working hours   40.39 41.93   41.84 45.27 ***  
Per capita consumption  402,264 392,956   217,047 220,612   
           Social network         
Percentage of village officials known  0.91 0.93   0.64 0.67 ***  
Frequency  of meetings   7.49 8.41   4.81 5.32 ***  
Number of observations  361 1,558   4,120 3,920   
          Notes: *, **, and *** show the t-test statistics for differences in averages of a particular variable for men and women. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations from representative adults in household data are used to differentiate characteristics of men and women in 
the general population. Primary education consists of finishing primary school, secondary education means finishing junior and secondary 
high school, tertiary education means finishing university and post-graduate studies. Per capita consumption is standardized for BKM 
members and households, as they are collected in different survey time-frames. For the BKM members, all available observations are used, 
except for calculations of per capita consumption, household size and social network, for which we use only the information from the three 
representative BKM members.  
 
Interestingly, we find that the similarities of preferences between male and female BKM 
may be due to the similarities in their socioeconomic backgrounds. Comparing female and 
male BKM members (column 1), it appears that women in the BKM are as educated, as rich, 
and have as high levels of social networks as their male counterparts. Comparing BKM 
members with the overall group of adults who are eligible to run for office, it appears that 
particularly highly qualified people are chosen to join the BKM (column 2).36
 
 These results 
are important in analyzing the effect of gender gap preferences on policy outcomes. If the 
preferences of female and male members of the BKM do not differ on average then there 
might be no effect of female representation in the BKM on policy outcomes. Thus, any 
effect on policy outcomes can be driven by some other related forces. 
 
                                                 
36 More detailed discussion about the role of high qualified BKM members on project choice is discussed in 
chapter 1. 
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3.5 Estimation results 
In this section, we first examine the effect of median voter preference on the shares of UPP2 
budget allocation toward all programs. Subsequently, we investigate whether female 
representation matters for the priorities and policies made by BKM members concerning 
budget allocation. Finally, we further explore the issue of whether the higher number of 
females in the BKM will be more responsive to accommodating the relative preferences of 
female voters or female BKM members on allocation of UPP2 resources. Our overall results 
show that the effects vary with different programs.  
 
3.5.1 Median voter preference and female representation in BKM 
Table 3.6 presents the effect of median voter preference and female representation in the 
BKM on UPP2 funding allocation. The eight columns in each panel show the results of 
estimating the share of the budget for each of the eight programs covered by UPP2. In Panel 
I, we estimate UPP2 funding allocation decisions using only the median voter preference 
dummy variable, mvoter, which takes a value of 1 if any of the preferences of the median 
voter match the funding allocation toward a particular program of the dependent variable. 
Column 5 shows that the variable mvoter has a significant positive effect on the shares of 
budget allocation for education, health, and irrigation infrastructure programs, but less effect 
on training programs. According to the magnitude of the coefficient, it appears that the 
budget portion applied toward education, health, and irrigation infrastructure is 1.1 percent 
significantly higher in kelurahan where the median voter brought the issue forward in 
relation to activities covered by this program. By contrast, in kelurahan where the median 
voter raised the issue of the need for training activities, the budget share applied toward 
training programs decreases. We find this result to indicate that none of the representatives 
were committed to the preferences of the median voter who complains about the need for 
more training programs. Nevertheless, female BKM members do accommodate the 
preferences of this median voter more, as will be explained in the following paragraphs. 
The main effect of the representative’s gender on policy outcomes is captured by the 
inclusion of the variable rfemale, which is the proportion of BKM members who are female. 
The results in Panel II and Panel III show that the inclusion of rfemale neither adds further 
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explanation of the results nor changes the effect of median voter preferences. This is 
surprising yet expected, since male and female BKM members in general have similar 
preferences toward different programs offered by UPP2 (as shown in Table 3.4). If women's 
preferences are not different from those of their male counterparts, the gender of the 
representative is irrelevant to shaping policy outcomes. 
Interestingly, when the interaction term between rfemale and mvoter is included (Panel IV), 
it turns out that the coefficient of mvoter changes, while the interaction term has a positive 
significant effect with a larger magnitude (column 5c and column 7c). It seems that a higher 
share of female BKM members helps to accommodate the preferences of the median voter 
by allocating a higher proportion of the budget toward the programs preferred by the median 
voter. According to column 5c, an increase of the share of females in the BKM board 
membership by one standard deviation (0.14) above its mean (0.19) is associated with a 3.13 
percent increase in the budget share for education, health, and irrigation projects, and a 0.85 
percent increase for training programs.  
 
3.5.2 Female representation and the gender gap in voter 
preferences 
We further examine whether higher female representation in BKM is associated with greater 
responsiveness toward the relative preferences of female voters, although the results so far 
show that the fraction of women in the BKM alone does not have any effect on budget 
allocations. In Table 3.7, we include variable 𝐷𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑝  which represents the relative strength 
of female voter preference toward each UPP2 program. The inclusion of this variable does 
not change the previous results. 
In general, we find that the higher intensity of women voters’ relative preferences for 
welfare programs (higher 𝐷𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑝 ) is associated with more budget allocations to welfare 
programs, such as poverty grants, elderly support, scholarships, health support, etc. (column 
6). This result is in accord with Table 3.4, which shows that female voters’ preferences are 
most different from those of male voters with respect to welfare programs, while both male 
and female BKM members tend to agree on the importance of this program. 
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In column 3, the gender gap in preferences toward public sanitation, 𝐷𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝑝 , is negative and 
significant while its interaction with the variable rfemale is positive and significant, with a 
larger magnitude. This result implies that a higher number of complaints about public 
sanitation from women is met with an increase in the proportion of the budget allocated to 
sanitation programs, but only if there is higher female-to-male ratio in the BKM. Panel II 
shows that this result remains consistent, even after taking out the effect of voter and 
mvoter*rfemale variables. This consistent result makes sense of the fact that even though the 
preferences of female BKM members are similar to the preferences of male BKM members, 
they differ most on the topic of public sanitation programs (see Table 3.4). We calculate the 
effect of rfemale over the range of in 𝐷𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 in our sample, from -0.6 to 0.8, and 
show the result in Figure 3.2, together with the 95 percent confidence interval. 
 
Figure 3.2 Effect of the share of females in BKM on public sanitation budget (95% CIs). 
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 81 
Table 3.6 The role of median voter preference and female representatives in UPP2 budget allocation 
 
Dependent variable: The proportion of the budget allocated to each program 
PANEL I PANEL II 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) (7a) (8a) 
                 
mvoter -0.014 0.028 0.000 -0.010 0.011** 0.006 -0.008* -0.000         (-0.805) (0.963) (0.029) (-0.741) (2.182) (0.788) (-1.928) (-0.006)         
                 
rfemale         
0.086 0.027 -0.079 0.028 -0.001 -0.000 -0.006 -0.054 
        (0.893) (0.832) (-1.383) (0.713) (-0.172) (-0.013) (-0.466) (-0.672) 
                 Number of Obs. 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 
Log-Likelihood 161.34 283.16 214.65 282.90 525.24 321.33 426.84 188.37 161.65 282.44 215.85 282.85 523.93 320.90 426.11 188.77 
                  
 
 
Dependent variable: The proportion of the budget allocated to each program 
PANEL III PANEL IV 
(1b) (b2) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b) (7b) (8b) (1c) (2c) (3c) (4c) (5c) (6c) (7c) (8c) 
                 
mvoter 
-0.011 0.027 0.002 -0.009 0.011** 0.006 -0.009** -0.000 0.006 0.009 -0.002 -0.023 -0.034*** 0.017 -0.014*** -0.005 
(-0.667) (0.938) (0.155) (-0.690) (2.204) (0.806) (-2.021) (-0.003) (0.204) (0.266) (-0.093) (-1.212) (-2.909) (1.456) (-3.194) (-0.139) 
                 
rfemale 
0.078 0.024 -0.079 0.026 -0.002 -0.003 -0.010 -0.054 0.106 0.019 -0.089 0.017 -0.002 0.014 -0.011 -0.058 
(0.818) (0.725) (-1.393) (0.643) (-0.266) (-0.096) (-0.719) (-0.670) (1.097) (0.561) (-1.241) (0.413) (-0.215) (0.369) (-0.783) (-0.743) 
                 
mvoter*rfemale         -0.094 0.103 0.023 0.068 0.223*** -0.054 0.071* 0.026 
        (-0.661) (0.956) (0.253) (0.644) (4.031) (-1.417) (1.694) (0.124) 
                 Number of obs. 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 
Log-Likelihood 161.91 283.42 215.86 283.21 525.29 321.34 427.14 188.77 162.27 283.96 215.90 283.61 526.01 322.11 427.75 188.79 
                 Notes:  
1. The proportion of the budget allocated for each program is estimated using OLS equation by equation, whereas the dependent variable is the share of UPP2 budget applied toward: (1) roads/bridges 
improvement, (2) house improvement, (3) public sanitation, (4) water and public lighting, (5) education, health and irrigation, (6) welfare programs, (7) training, and (8) microfinance.  
2. T-values reported in parentheses are computed on the basis of heteroskedastic-robust standard errors.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
3. The dummy variable mvoter is defined in the text: the variable takes the value of 1 if any of the median voter preferences in kelurahan i match with any of the eight UPP2 programs offered.  
4. The regressions control for population (log), mean per capita consumption (log), distance to the closest bus station (in minutes), share of the population with access to clean water, share of the population with 
access to latrines, and the number of financial institutions used to save or borrow.  
5. Districts fixed effects are included. 
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Table 3.7 The role of female representatives and voter’s gender gap in preferences in UPP2 budget allocation   
 
 
 Dependent variable: The proportion of the budget allocated to each program 
PANEL I  PANEL II 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) (7a) (8a) 
                  
mvoter 0.005 0.007 -0.003 -0.021 -0.036*** 0.014 -0.015*** 0.006          (0.174) (0.202) (-0.117) (-1.071) (-3.177) (1.184) (-2.835) (0.179)          
                  
rfemale 0.110 0.019 -0.075 0.015 -0.002 0.018 -0.011 -0.063  0.093 0.022 -0.078 0.023 -0.002 0.009 -0.007 -0.067 (1.103) (0.517) (-1.037) (0.340) (-0.251) (0.481) (-0.769) (-0.779)  (0.933) (0.621) (-1.331) (0.572) (-0.193) (0.274) (-0.527) (-0.829) 
                  
mvoter*rfemale 
-0.086 0.108 -0.003 0.063 0.230*** -0.044 0.072 -0.040  
        
(-0.596) (0.948) (-0.026) (0.582) (4.264) (-1.123) (1.599) (-0.185)  
        
                  
𝐷𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑝  
-0.057 0.050 -0.110* -0.032 -0.008 0.050* -0.006 -0.044  -0.063 0.069 -0.106* -0.043 -0.010 0.058** 0.014 -0.047 
(-0.746) (0.445) (-1.799) (-0.613) (-0.495) (1.773) (-0.120) (-0.376)  (-0.837) (0.655) (-1.892) (-0.843) (-0.624) (2.094) (0.304) (-0.427) 
                  
𝐷𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑝 * rfemale 
0.288 -0.089 0.521** 0.033 0.030 -0.102 -0.006 -0.330  0.318 -0.241 0.507** 0.046 0.024 -0.143 -0.076 -0.292 
(0.793) (-0.206) (2.164) (0.123) (0.512) (-0.821) (-0.035) (-0.584)  (0.866) (-0.654) (2.331) (0.178) (0.415) (-1.204) (-0.462) (-0.581) 
                  Number of Obs. 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153  153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 




1. The proportion of the budget allocated for each program is estimated using OLS equation by equation, whereas the dependent variable is the proportion of UPP2 budget applied toward: (1) roads/bridges 
improvement, (2) house improvement, (3) public sanitation, (4) water and public lighting, (5) education, health and irrigation, (6) welfare programs, (7) training, and (8) microfinance.  
2. T-values reported in parentheses are computed on the basis of heteroskedastic-robust standard errors.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
3. The dummy variable mvoter is defined in the text: the variable takes the value of 1 if any of the median voter preferences in kelurahan i match with any of the eight UPP2 programs offered.  
4. The variable is defined as the relative strength of female voters’ preference for program p in kelurahan i.  
5. The regressions control for population (log), mean per capita consumption (log), distance to the closest bus station (in minutes), share of the population with access to clean water, share of the population with 
access to latrines, and the number of financial institutions used to save or borrow.  




3.5.3 Female representation and the gender gap in preferences of 
BKM members 
In Table 3.8, we replace variable 𝐷𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑝  with 𝐷𝐵𝐾𝑀
𝑝 , which represents the gender gap in the 
preferences of BKM members. Replicating the key regressions in Table 3.8, the signs and 
significances of the variable mvoter and mvoter*rfemale remains consistent. Focusing on 
variable 𝐷𝐵𝐾𝑀
𝑝 , (column 7 in Panel I), it can be seen that 𝐷𝐵𝐾𝑀
𝑝  has a positive and significant 
coefficient, which indicates that funding allocation for training programs is 1.7 percent 
significantly higher in kelurahan where female BKM members prefer more training projects. 
However, the interaction term rfemale*𝐷𝐵𝐾𝑀
𝑝  is significantly negative, which means that a 
higher intensity of female BKM member preferences for training programs does not 
necessarily translate into a higher allocation toward training programs, if the share of 
females in the BKM is higher. According to column 7, an increase in the share of females in 
the BKM for one standard deviation above its mean is associated with a decrease of budget 
allocations toward training programs from 7.52 percent to 7.29 percent. Thus, the effect of 
the differences in preferences of male and female BKM members seems not to be reflected 
here as much as it is in changes of composition of budget shares for public sanitation. 
3.5.4 Robustness checks 
In robustness tests, we use the number of projects instead of the costs of projects to calculate 
the dependent variable. Repeating the key regression, Table 3.9 shows a consistent result, 
although the magnitudes of the regression coefficients are smaller. In Table 3.9 column 5, it 
can be seen that the proportion of the budget allocated to education, health and irrigation 
facilities is significantly higher in kelurahan where the median voter raises the issue related 
to this program, although there is no effect found from the interaction variable 
mvoter*rfemale on budget allocation.  Furthermore, Table 3.10 presents the result of the 
inclusion of the gender gap in the preferences of voters. Column 3 shows the robust result 
that a higher proportion of women in BKM accommodate the intensity of female voters’ 
preferences on public sanitation. The interaction between 𝐷𝑣𝑖
𝑝 and rfemale is positive, at 
coefficient of 0.549 and significant at 10 percent. However, Table C3 in the appendix shows 
that there is no effect of the gender gap in the preferences of BKM members 𝐷𝐵𝐾𝑀
𝑝  on 
budget allocation. 
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 Dependent variable: The proportion of the budget allocated to each program 
PANEL I  PANEL II 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) (7a) (8a) 
                  
mvoter 0.013 0.014 0.002 -0.019 -0.033** 0.014 -0.017*** -0.007          (0.432) (0.366) (0.077) (-0.908) (-2.463) (1.068) (-3.268) (-0.205)          
                  
rfemale 0.075 0.026 -0.081 -0.006 -0.000 -0.005 -0.017 -0.014  0.045 0.032 -0.071 0.003 -0.000 -0.016 -0.012 -0.011 (0.758) (0.723) (-1.197) (-0.135) (-0.056) (-0.130) (-1.318) (-0.175)  (0.442) (0.920) (-1.296) (0.055) (-0.022) (-0.453) (-0.909) (-0.134) 
                  
mvoter*rfemale 
-0.130 0.098 0.021 0.076 0.214*** -0.042 0.080* 0.025  
        
(-0.895) (0.867) (0.246) (0.707) (3.307) (-0.988) (1.938) (0.132)  
        
                  
𝐷𝐵𝐾𝑀
𝑝  
0.014 0.015 -0.014 0.014 -0.012 -0.006 0.017** 0.018  0.021 0.005 -0.014 0.016 -0.013 -0.009 0.015** 0.019 
(0.277) (0.578) (-0.525) (0.650) (-1.512) (-0.476) (2.213) (0.496)  (0.409) (0.237) (-0.523) (0.810) (-1.616) (-0.750) (2.070) (0.517) 
                  
𝐷𝐵𝐾𝑀
𝑝 * rfemale 
-0.114 -0.008 0.054 -0.075 0.048 0.011 -0.084* 0.019  -0.154 0.009 0.058 -0.077 0.049 0.020 -0.077* 0.014 
(-0.518) (-0.076) (0.507) (-0.925) (1.375) (0.295) (-1.870) (0.117)  (-0.686) (0.085) (0.554) (-0.987) (1.470) (0.575) (-1.757) (0.080) 
                  Number of Obs. 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153  153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 
Log-Likelihood 165.47 284.31 217.98 285.53 527.01 324.36 432.42 192.13  164.57 282.57 217.84 284.98 525.16 323.59 430.13 192.11 
 
Notes:  
1. The proportion of the budget allocated for each program is estimated using OLS equation by equation, whereas the dependent variable is the proportion of UPP2 budget applied toward: (1) roads/bridges 
improvement, (2) house improvement, (3) public sanitation, (4) water and public lighting, (5) education, health and irrigation, (6) welfare programs, (7) training, and (8) microfinance.  
2. T-values reported in parentheses are computed on the basis of heteroskedastic-robust standard errors.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
3. The dummy variable mvoter is defined in the text: the variable takes the value of 1 if any of the median voter preferences in kelurahan i match with any of the eight UPP2 programs offered.  
4. The variable is defined as the relative strength of female voters’ preference for program p in kelurahan i.  
5. The regressions control for population (log), mean per capita consumption (log), distance to the closest bus station (in minutes), share of the population with access to clean water, share of the population with 
access to latrines, and the number of financial institutions used to save or borrow.  




Table 3.9 Robustness check using alternative dependent variables, the role of the median voter and female representatives 
 
Dependent variable: The proportion of the number of projects in each program  
PANEL I PANEL II 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) (7a) (8a) 
                 
mvoter 
-0.011 0.027 0.005 -0.010 0.006** 0.018 -0.006 -0.006         (-0.695) (1.145) (0.331) (-0.751) (2.508) (1.606) (-1.315) (-0.219)         
                 
rfemale         
0.022 0.047 -0.047 0.003 -0.008 0.047 0.003 -0.066 
        (0.313) (1.155) (-0.785) (0.063) (-1.165) (1.220) (0.201) (-0.734) 
                 Number of Obs. 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 
Log-Likelihood 181.08 287.85 205.04 285.37 526.07 253.57 429.16 160.54 180.81 287.83 205.35 284.94 526.34 252.67 428.61 160.93 
                  
 
 
Dependent variable: The proportion of the number of projects in each program 
PANEL III PANEL IV 
(1b) (b2) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b) (7b) (8b) (1c) (2c) (3c) (4c) (5c) (6c) (7c) (8c) 
                 
mvoter 
-0.011 0.025 0.006 -0.010 0.007*** 0.017 -0.006 -0.005 0.002 0.022 0.005 -0.027 -0.002 0.025 -0.007 0.034 
(-0.655) (1.090) (0.411) (-0.732) (2.811) (1.484) (-1.284) (-0.220) (0.078) (0.710) (0.236) (-1.557) (-0.122) (1.560) (-1.120) (1.092) 
                 
rfemale 
0.015 0.043 -0.049 0.001 -0.008 0.039 0.000 -0.066 0.035 0.042 -0.051 -0.010 -0.008 0.051 0.000 -0.035 
(0.206) (1.062) (-0.819) (0.016) (-1.221) (0.965) (0.019) (-0.734) (0.484) (1.022) (-0.695) (-0.214) (-1.202) (1.069) (0.014) (-0.397) 
                 
mvoter*rfemale         
-0.069 0.022 0.004 0.087 0.040 -0.039 0.006 -0.224 
        
(-0.624) (0.271) (0.041) (0.819) (0.607) (-0.641) (0.120) (-1.397) 
                 Number of Obs. 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 
Log-Likelihood 181.10 288.78 205.44 285.37 526.82 254.06 429.16 160.96 181.35 288.81 205.45 286.04 526.84 254.23 429.17 162.07 
                 Notes:  
1. The proportion of the number of projects in each program is estimated using OLS equation by equation, whereas the dependent variable is the share of the number of: (1) roads/bridges programs, (2) house 
improvement programs, (3) public sanitation programs, (4) water and public lighting programs, (5) education, health and irrigation programs, (6) welfare programs, (7) training programs, and (8) microfinance 
programs.  
2. T-values reported in parentheses are computed on the basis of heteroskedastic-robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
3. The dummy variable mvoter is defined in the text: the variable takes the value of 1 if any of the median voter preferences in kelurahan i match with any of the eight UPP2 programs offered.  
4. The regressions control for population (log), mean per capita consumption (log), distance to the closest bus station (in minutes), share of the population with access to clean water, share of the population with 
access to latrines, and the number of financial institutions used to save or borrow.  





Table 3.10 Robustness check using alternative dependent variables, the role of voters’ gender gap in preferences 
 
 
 Dependent variable: The proportion of the number of projects in each program 
PANEL I  PANEL II 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) (7a) (8a) 
                  
mvoter 0.001 0.022 0.005 -0.028 -0.004 0.026 -0.006 0.036          (0.047) (0.722) (0.216) (-1.549) (-0.347) (1.515) (-0.946) (1.113)          
                  
rfemale 0.033 0.046 -0.035 -0.009 -0.009 0.047 -0.001 -0.042  0.023 0.047 -0.046 0.002 -0.008 0.041 0.000 -0.074 (0.463) (1.036) (-0.473) (-0.194) (-1.243) (0.937) (-0.098) (-0.484)  (0.318) (1.075) (-0.740) (0.048) (-1.202) (0.945) (0.035) (-0.814) 
                  
mvoter*rfemale 
-0.062 0.029 -0.025 0.087 0.052 -0.052 0.002 -0.278*          (-0.574) (0.341) (-0.225) (0.792) (0.808) (-0.776) (0.047) (-1.767)          
                  
𝐷𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑝  
-0.027 -0.009 -0.114* 0.001 -0.016 -0.000 0.023 0.113  -0.032 0.013 -0.114** -0.014 -0.018 0.012 0.031 0.082 
(-0.472) (-0.093) (-1.906) (0.010) (-0.780) (-0.008) (0.605) (1.104)  (-0.555) (0.151) (-2.128) (-0.256) (-0.910) (0.233) (0.796) (0.840) 
                  
𝐷𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑝 * rfemale 
0.271 0.102 0.559** 0.020 0.057 0.112 0.115 -0.717  0.295 -0.024 0.549** 0.038 0.056 0.069 0.090 -0.411 
(0.849) (0.239) (2.005) (0.100) (0.863) (0.553) (0.576) (-1.430)  (0.918) (-0.065) (2.315) (0.197) (0.860) (0.364) (0.452) (-0.877) 
                  Number of obs. 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153  153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 
Log-Likelihood 181.95 288.87 207.67 286.05 527.08 254.63 430.89 162.88  181.49 287.84 207.63 284.97 526.63 253.14 430.49 161.23 
 
Notes:  
1. The proportion of the number of projects in each program is estimated using OLS equation by equation, whereas the dependent variable is the share of the number of: (1) roads/bridges programs, (2) house 
improvement programs, (3) public sanitation programs, (4) water and public lighting programs, (5) education, health and irrigation programs, (6) welfare programs, (7) training programs, and (8) microfinance 
programs.  
2. T-values reported in parentheses are computed on the basis of heteroskedastic-robust standard errors.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
3. The dummy variable mvoter is defined in the text: the variable takes the value of 1 if any of the median voter preferences in kelurahan i match with any of the eight UPP2 programs offered.  
4. The variable is defined as the relative strength of female voters’ preference for program p in kelurahan i.  
5. The regressions control for population (log), mean per capita consumption (log), distance to the closest bus station (minutes), the share of the population that has access to clean water, the share of the population 
that has access to latrines, and the number of financial institutions used to save or borrow.  





Previous studies have discussed the importance of female representation in policy making for 
channeling women’s preferences into policy outcomes. However, very few studies analyze the 
relevance of the differences in preferences of male and female politicians for influencing 
policy outcomes. In this study, we use data on ex-ante preferences of both voters and 
politicians in the context of UPP2, a community-driven anti-poverty development program 
implemented in 154 communities in Indonesia, and relate these preferences to the proportion 
of the budget allocated to different anti-poverty programs. We begin by testing the classic 
median voter theorem, which predicts that politicians will implement the median voter's 
preferences, and therefore politicians' identities, including categories such as gender, will not 
matter to outcomes. Subsequently, we test whether the movement of women into public office 
will affect public spending on programs that are more responsive to women’s needs. 
We find that in most cases, the preferences of the median voter do not matter for policy 
outcomes, but in some cases they do. Our findings demonstrate that the proportion of the 
UPP2 budget allocated to education, health and irrigation programs is higher in communities 
where the median voter raises the issue in relation to this particular program. We further find 
that the proportion of representatives who are female is not the main driver of changes in the 
composition of the UPP2 budget. However, a greater movement of women into local 
representative office does facilitate accommodating the preferences of the median voter, and 
particularly the preferences of female voters who request more attention to public sanitation. 
One possible reason for the small effect of female representatives is that the preferences of 
female and male representatives are similar, and that they differ only on issues related to 
public sanitation, but not more generally. We find that these similarities in preferences of 
male and female representatives may be due to the fact that both groups come from the top of 
the community distribution; that is, they have the same high levels of education, high 
consumption per capita, and high social connectedness. Still, our findings showing that the 
gender of the policy-maker matters for outcomes cast doubt on the prediction of the median 











Table A1. Distribution of UPP2 projects, 2004-2007 
Project Type     Non-revolving         Revolving       Total projects Number Cost* Number Cost*  Number Cost* 
 Infrastructure      
Roads/bridges 18,626 130.7 388 1.8 19,014 132.5 
Housing 4,555 26.1 250 1.6 4,805 27.7 
Public sanitation 10,063 57.6 202 1.3 10,265 58.8 
Public utilities 6,746 40.2 87 0.4 
 
6,833 40.6 
Infrastructure - others 1,617 10.0 27 0.1 1,644 10.0 
 Social      
Social assistance 16,134 82.8 171 1.1 16,305 83.9 
Trainings 4,531 23.1 1,300 2.6 5,831 25.7 
Social-others 843 4.8 82 0.5 925 5.3 
 Economic      
Home industry 1,278 7.6 3131 15.9 4,409 23.6 
Micro retail 565 4.0 38,719 185.5 39,284 189.6 
Economic-others 536 3.5 15,481 71.5 16,017 75.00 
Notes: Project costs in billion rupiah 
 
 
Table A2. The construction of elite index using principal component analysis 
    Correlations 
   
 
Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp 1 1.28086 0.289166 0.427 0.427 
Comp 2 0.991689 0.264234 0.331 0.758 




   Variable (standardized value) 
  
Comp 1 
Per capita consumption 
  
0.699 
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Table B1. Different estimation methods: The relationships between bribes and the time spent with 
officials 
 








(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Bribes 0.500*** 0.500*** 0.422*** 0.079*** 
 (0.175) (0.173) (0.038) (0.009) 
Employees 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.001* 0.000** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Employees squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age -0.075 -0.075 0.000 0.004 
 (0.105) (0.103) (0.036) (0.013) 
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Dummy: multinationals 0.192 0.192 -0.167 -0.035 
 (1.284) (1.263) (0.359) (0.105) 
Dummy: has government share -0.414 -0.414 1.240 0.439 
 (2.187) (2.152) (1.044) (0.283) 
Dummy: if export and/or import 1.106 1.106 1.055*** 0.353*** 
 (0.991) (0.975) (0.397) (0.128) 
/cut1    0.975*** 
    (0.300) 
/cut2    1.863*** 
    (0.304) 
/cut3    2.737*** 
    (0.326) 
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 313 894 894 894 
Adjusted R2/chi2 0.044 0.076 143.1 0.078 
     
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of managerial time spent with officials to expedite business (percent). Robust standard errors in 











2SLS Estimation  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
         
 
Second stage, the dependent variable is the ratio of time spent with officials 
         
Bribes 0.824*** 0.806*** 0.797*** 0.799*** 0.798*** 0.788*** 0.786*** 0.663* 0.675* 
 (0.218) (0.219) (0.211) (0.223) (0.210) (0.210) (0.223) (0.376) (0.392) 
Employees  0.002* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.002* 0.002* 0.003** 0.003* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Employees squared  -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000** -0.000* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age   0.028 0.021 0.038 0.021 0.018 -0.033 -0.028 
   (0.172) (0.170) (0.173) (0.176) (0.176) (0.164) (0.165) 
Age squared   -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Dummy: multinationals    -0.081   -0.228 -0.593 -0.742 
    (0.937)   (0.915) (0.883) (0.945) 
Dummy: has government share     1.016  1.219 0.065 0.083 
     (1.186)  (1.131) (1.447) (1.400) 
Dummy: if export and/or import      0.785 0.926 1.098 0.956 
      (1.078) (1.085) (1.114) (1.041) 
          
Bribes
First stage, the dependent variable is bribes 
0.366*** t-1 0.365*** 0.363*** 0.345*** 0.345*** 0.361*** 0.342*** 0.322** 0.312** 
 (0.094) (0.094) (0.093) (0.089) (0.089) (0.093) (0.089 (0.127) (0.119) 
Employees  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Employees squared  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age   -0.085 -0.094 -0.101 -0.089 -0.117 -0.127 -0.125 
   (0.080) (0.081) (0.081) (0.080) (0.081) (.084) (0.085) 
Age squared   0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Dummy: multinationals    0.348   0.244 0.329 0.214 
    (0.454)   (0.452) (0.422) (0.425) 
Dummy: has government share     -1.614***  -1.464*** -1.695*** -1.442*** 
     (0.447)  (0. .471) (0.413) (0.447) 
Dummy: if export and/or import      0.448 0.578 0.539 0.405 
      (0.302) (0.351) (0.382) (0.367) 
Sector fixed effects No No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Region fixed effects No No No No No No No No Yes 
Number of observations 343 335 329 327 329 329 327 322 322 
Adjusted R2 0.137 0.140 0.141 0.132 0.138 0.139 0.128 0.122 0.110 
Pagan Hall (p-value) 0.875 0.818 0.799 0.819 0.883 0.937 0.729 0.654 0.935 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman (p-value) 0.886 0.849 0.885 0.886 0.879 0.885 0.705 0.704 0.784 
F-stat first stage 15.24 15.03 15.06 15.03 15.07 14.80 14.75 6.44 6.92 
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of managerial time spent with officials to deal with bureaucracy (%). Robust standard errors reported 
in parentheses. In IV estimation, the instrument for bribes is the lagged value of bribes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table B3. The relationship between bribes and time spent with officials, by sector 
Dependent variable: the share of managerial time spent with bureaucracy 
(percent) 
Coefficient of bribes 
(Standard errors) 
Number of Obs. 
 
RE 2SLS FE 
    
    
All sample 0.497*** 0.766*** 0.365** 
 (0.100) (0.123) (0.183) 
 902 324 902 
Food, beverages and cigarette product 0.862*** 1.105*** 1.120*** 
 (0.286) (0.107) (0.202) 
 91 30 91 
Textile, garment, leather, footwear product 0.186 0.311 0.102 
 (0.135) (0.239) (0.123) 
 226 86 226 
Wood, bamboo, and rattan product 0.269* 0.515*** 0.598* 
 (0.158) (0.173) (0.324) 
 91 36 91 
Paper, paper product, printing and publishing 1.593*** 0.711** 0.672 
 (0.346) (0.290) (1.023) 
 31 11 31 
Chemical product, oil & gas, rubber and plastic 0.818*** 0.587 0.848 
 (0.271) (0.670) (0.535) 
 138 51 138 
Non metallic mineral product 0.536 1.329 0.735 
 (0.399) (1.164) (0.883) 
 41 11 41 
Basic metallic product 0.943** 1.474*** 1.233*** 
 (0.390) (0.183) (0.172) 
 85 31 85 
Non basic metallic product 0.469** 0.569*** 0.301 
 (0.197) (0.091) (0.311) 
 173 59 173 
Notes: Every regression controlled for firm characteristics. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table B4. Non-linear relationship between bribes and the time spent with officials, 2SLS full results 
 2SLS Estimation 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     Bribes 1.413 1.171 17.615 6.398 
 (1.035) (0.924) (78.908) (12.568) 
Bribes squared -0.040 -0.029 -1.179 -0.417 
 (0.058) (0.052) (5.346) (0.871) 
Employees  0.001 -0.014 -0.003 
  (0.001) (0.078) (0.011) 
Employees squared  -0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age  0.080 1.431 0.532 
  (0.131) (6.729) (1.122) 
Age squared  -0.004 -0.035 -0.015 
  (0.003) (0.156) (0.027) 
Dummy: multinationals  -0.684 3.194 0.520 
  (0.775) (16.979) (2.936) 
Dummy: has government share  1.849 9.537 4.668 
  (1.231) (41.008) (8.579) 
Dummy: if export and/or import  1.639** 6.739 3.118 
  (0.718) (24.124) (3.666) 
 First stage, the dependent variable: bribes    
     
Bribes 0.664*** t-1 0.603*** 0.783*** 0.735*** 
 (0.180) (0.171) (0.174) (0.157) 
Bribest-1 -0.01* squared -0.008 -0.018*** -0.016*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Employees  0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Employees squared  0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age  -0.128 -0.125 -0.126 
  (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) 
Age squared  0.003 0.003 0.003 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Dummy: multinationals  0.350 0.336 0.289 
  (0.445) (0.422) (0.428) 
Dummy: has government share  -1.495** -1.763*** -1.485** 
  (0.627) (0.659) (0.653) 
Dummy: if export and/or import  0.617* 0.564*** 0.479 
  (0.339 (0.358) (0.358) 
F-stat 10.71 10.07 10.81 12.09 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 First stage, the dependent variable: bribes squared (%)    
     Bribes 9.170** t-1 7.885** 11.160** 9.938*** 
 (4.182) (4.040) (4.385) (3.564) 
Bribest-1 -0.086 squared -0.060 -0.253** -0.213** 
 (0.116) (0.111) (0.127) (0.109) 
Employees  -0.014 -0.011 -0.007 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
Employees squared  0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age  -0.808 -0.626 -0.606 
  (1.555) (1.609) (1.667) 
Age squared  0.013 0.011 0.008 
  (0.034) (0.035) (0.038) 
Dummy: multinationals  8.723 8.120 7.080 
  (9.166) (7.542) (7.716) 
Dummy: has government share  -12.647 -18.131* -11.850 
  (9.309) (9.883) (10.498) 
Dummy: if export and/or import  12.082** 12.304* 10.133 
  (5.963) (7.169) (6.541) 
F-stat 5.81 5.41 4.38 5.37 
Sector fixed effects/region fixed effects no/no no/no yes/no yes/yes 
Number of observations 340 324 319 319 
Adjusted R2 0.147 0.163 -36.100 -4.869 
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of managerial time spent with officials to deal with bureaucracy (percent). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The 















Table C1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Min Max 
Share of females in BKM 0.19 0.14 0 0.73 
Population 5,821 3,817 549 25,733 
Per capita consumption (in rupiah) 212,733 138,808 62,941 874,886 
Access to adequate water (according to the MDG definition)  0.8 0.2 0 1 
Access to latrine  0.7 0.2 0 1 
Distance to the nearest central bus station (in minutes) 14.9 13.3 0 90 
Number of financial institutions used to save/borrow 3.08 1.6 0 9 




Table C2. Women’s participation in UPP2 
  BKM institution    
Number of BKMs formed 2,059 unit  
Number of BKM members elected 25,537 person  
Number of woman BKM members elected 16.34 percent  
    
  Election of BKM's members    
Number of adult voters in kelurahan 3,114,763 person  
Average adult voters in kelurahan 64.98 percent  
Average female adult voters in kelurahan 48.60 percent  
    
  Participation of women    
Woman facilitator 22.75 percent  
Woman participated during initial socialization to total participant  30.07 percent  
Woman participated in FGD to total participant 39.36 percent  
Woman participated in CDP preparation to total participant 32.82 percent  













 Dependent variable: The proportion of the number of projects in each program 
PANEL I  PANEL II 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) (7a) (8a) 
                  
mvoter -0.001 0.029 0.007 -0.020 0.002 0.020 -0.008 0.045          (-0.046) (0.857) (0.326) (-1.077) (0.141) (1.257) (-1.288) (1.283)          
                  
rfemale 0.013 0.047 -0.051 -0.047 -0.005 0.020 -0.006 -0.000  0.006 0.048 -0.048 -0.037 -0.004 0.018 -0.003 -0.037 (0.195) (1.154) (-0.713) (-0.855) (-0.711) (0.409) (-0.408) (-0.001)  (0.094) (1.220) (-0.804) (-0.709) (-0.671) (0.445) (-0.205) (-0.428) 
                  
mvoter*rfemale 
-0.052 0.003 0.003 0.081 0.018 -0.025 0.008 -0.279          (-0.478) (0.038) (0.037) (0.750) (0.244) (-0.395) (0.175) (-1.612)          
                  
𝐷𝐵𝐾𝑀
𝑝  
0.051 0.048 -0.013 0.029 -0.027 -0.008 0.015* 0.056  0.052 0.032 -0.013 0.032* -0.027 -0.010 0.013* 0.044 
(1.161) (1.219) (-0.499) (1.519) (-1.569) (-0.536) (1.893) (1.481)  (1.190) (0.888) (-0.479) (1.727) (-1.593) (-0.742) (1.781) (1.026) 
                  
𝐷𝐵𝐾𝑀
𝑝 * rfemale 
-0.228 -0.180 0.061 -0.103 0.097 -0.000 -0.058 -0.245  -0.240 -0.144 0.064 -0.105* 0.097 0.003 -0.055 -0.169 
(-0.996) (-1.052) (0.590) (-1.570) (1.560) (-0.002) (-1.356) (-1.207)  (-1.025) (-0.861) (0.632) (-1.697) (1.583) (0.073) (-1.296) (-0.670) 
                  Number of obs. 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153  153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 
Log-Likelihood 185.39 289.63 206.41 289.18 532.05 256.60 430.99 165.52  184.96 288.41 206.24 288.54 531.67 255.35 430.22 163.82 
 
Notes:  
1. The proportion of the number of projects in each program is estimated using OLS equation by equation, whereas the dependent variable is the share of the number of: (1)  roads/bridges programs, (2) house improvement 
programs, (3) public sanitation programs, (4) water and public lighting programs, (5) education, health and irrigation programs, (6) welfare programs, (7) training programs, and (8) microfinance programs. 
2. T-values reported in parentheses are computed on the basis of heteroskedastic-robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
3. The dummy variable mvoter is defined in the text: the variable takes the value of 1 if any of the median voter preferences in kelurahan i match with any of the eight UPP2 programs offered.  
4. The variable is defined as the relative strength of female voters’ preference for program p in kelurahan i.  
5. The regressions control for population (log), mean per capita consumption (log), distance to the closest bus station (in minutes), share of the population with access to clean water, share of the population with access to 
latrines, and the number of financial institution used to save or borrow.  
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